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FOREWORD 
Basic technological systems such as the world energy system have come to join na- 
ture itself in forming the buttresses of man's activities. The interdependence this has led 
to in the contemporary world is nowhere better illustrated than it is by the evolution of 
the world energy system over the past ten years. 
Countries that meet their energy needs largely through imports are particularly 
aware of thisnew kind of dependence. Clearly, the means for securing a sufficient measure 
of independence have to be found within such countries or within groups of such countries. 
However, an analysis of the problems that arise on the national level calls for an interna- 
tional perspective, which must also be long term to take account of the inertia of basic 
technological systems. 
IIASA's Energy Systems Program Group set out to gain just such a perspective in its 
global energy study. The Institute sought to quantify the possibilities for providing enough 
energy for a rapidly growing world population obligated to promote economic develop- 
ment worldwide whde using its energy resources wisely. 
The narrow technological pathsa cooperative world can take in order to achieve this 
goal have been pointed out in Energy in A Finite World (1981), the comprehensive report 
of the study by IIASA's Energy Systems Program Group. As well as the energy problem, 
Energy in a Finite World touches upon other truly global features, such as the effects of 
energy production and consumption on the climate and the environment, and the impacts 
of potential breakthroughs in science and technology. This information must eventually 
be input to institutionalized decision making - nonexistent at the global level - before it 
can actually be turned to use. 
An opportunity to test the applicability of the global study arose with the Energy 
Systems Program Group's cooperation with the services of the European Communities in 
investigating the energy problem emergingin the EC countries and the R&D strategies they 
are seeking to develop in response. The three-year study, supported by two contracts from 
the Directo~ate General for Research, Science, and Education of the Commission of the 
European Communities, highlighted the complexities of international interdependence. It 
is documented in this report. 
The report identifies some of the conflicts and differences that may arise between 
regional outlooks and a global perspective; between the balancing of demand and supply 
in a cooperating world, and the furthering of the objectivesof a group of countries such as 
the EC in a competitive world. Some possibilities were explored of how to resolve these 
conflicts by way of alternative energy R&D strategies. These strategies were formulated 
as energy scenarios for the EC. 
In the course of this study a gradual shift in focus occurred, as has happened with 
other truly novel analyses. The uncertainty about the directions of general economic 
development of the EC countries was found to match the uncertainty about the availabil- 
ity of reasonably priced energy on future world markets. The study prompted, but left 
open, the crucial question of the extent to whch a forward strategy of enlarging the 
indigenous supply potential should help decouple the general economic development of 
the European Communities from the worsening international energy outlook. 
WOLFGANG SASSIN 
Acting Leader 
Energy Systems Program 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Europe's present energy problem stems in the short term from relatively recent 
changes in oil prices on  the  world market. The European Community countries currently 
rely on  oil, 80% of it imported, for around half of  their entire energy needs. The extent 
of Europe's dependence o n  imported oil and its vulnerability to  supply disruptions were 
sharply illustrated by the 1973 oil crisis and the fourfold price rises that followed. The 
energy problem of the coming decades will be much more than a matter of  adjusting t o  
higher prices, however: within thirty years the world's known reserves of  conventional oil 
could be approaching exhaustion. The EC countries, poor in energy resources, must 
adjust their economies t o  a world energy system characterized by worldwide resource 
flows and increasing international interdependence. Since lead-times for the introduction 
of new energy technologies may range from thirty to  fifty years, a detailed analysis of 
potential long-term global developments is needed to design R&D strategies for the EC 
countries that are consistent with the resource and technological constraints. 
In 1979 the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis entered into a 
contract with the Directorate General for Research, Science, and Education of  the 
Commission of  the European Communities to investigate the long-term energy problem 
emerging in the EC countries and the national research and development strategies they 
are seeking to develop in response. IlASA had recently concluded the first ever globally 
comprehensive study of  the long-term world energy problem, in which researchers of the 
Institute's Energy Systems Program divided the world into seven regions of broadly 
similar economic and energy characteristics, and analyzed in detail their prospects for the 
fifty years t o  2030, a period during which the world's population is expected t o  rise t o  
eight billion. The study findings were guardedly optimistic - that the potential of known 
resources and technologies in hand or almost a t  hand will be sufficient t o  fuel a more 
prosperous world in 2030 that supports a population double that of 1975. Furthermore, 
by 2030 the world could be at  the threshold of  the critical and ultimately essential 
transition from an energy system based on  depletable fossil fuels (coal, oil, and gas) to  
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one based on nondepletable sustainable resources (solar energy, advanced nuclear reac- 
tors, renewables, etc.). (The detailed results are presented in Energy in a Finite World, the 
two-volume report of the globalstudy pubhshed in 1981 by Ballinger, and in an Executive 
Surllrnary ol- the same title.) 
In addition to  the global study, the present investigation used an earlier study of 
the EC's long-term energy problem as a point of departure: in 1980 the EC published the 
final report of its own technical study, made by a working group from the EC, the 
International Energy Agency, and IIASA. (Commission of the European Communities 
(1980) Crucial Choices for the Energy Transition.) The study, which explored a range of 
conservation and supply options using trend extrapolations of demographic, economic, 
and technological parameters, was instructive, but had critical shortcomings: it did not 
take due account of the interdependence between energy prices, energy demand, and the 
rate of supply, and it neglected feedback effects on the EC countries caused by the re- 
sponses of other world regions to the global energy problem. 
IIASA's present investigation therefore represents an attempt t o  establish how the 
European energy system could be adapted by technological change to  an optimistic 
assessment of future global conditions. The study explores the interaction between the 
energy system and the economy, adhering as closely as possible to a macroeconomic 
optimization principle that ties the economic value of energy to anticipated productivity 
levels of capital and labor. 
The Approach to the Analysis and the Assumptions Made 
The approach followed in the IIASA/EC study, as in IIASA's global study and in the 
EC's own Crucial Choices study, was one of scenario writing. Developing a scenario is 
neither t o  predict what will happen in the future nor t o  prescribe what should happen: it 
is simply a means of organizing the information available into comprehensive and intern- 
ally consistent synopses of the possible course of events. The study concentrated on the 
physical and economic aspects of the energy problem, and the methods used were those 
of engineering and economics. Limiting the analysis and methods in this way necessarily 
mean incorporating the following implicit assumptions: 
The future will be for the most part "business as usual". There will be no catas- 
trophic wars: no1 shall the energy problem be solved by technological panaceas. 
The world will be blessed with a high degree of international cooperation. Thus 
the results indicate what can be done with the world's endowment of energy 
resources, manpower, capital, and knowhow. In particular, the study assumes 
that there will be a functioning world trade in coal, oil, and gas, allowing re- 
sources to flow from the resource-rich to the resource-poor countries, and that 
there will be no  new cartels t o  fix energy price levels substantially above the 
cost price levels used for all nonoil trade in the scenarios. Developments since 
1975 indicate that this is over-optimistic, as countries have come to limit their 
oil and gas production in view of their own long-term national needs, and other 
energy prices have closely followed oil prices. 
Those social and political dimensions of the energy problem not explicitly 
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included in the analysis will not severely curtail the development of energy sup- 
plies during the next fifty years. The constraints taken into account in the study 
were physical (such as the heating values of different coal deposits), technical 
(such as the efficiency. of electricity plants), and structural (such as the limita- 
tions on the rate at which one energy source can be substituted for another). It 
must always be borne in mind when drawing conclusions from the results that 
social and political constraints, for example on nuclear energy growth, have 
been deliberately disregarded in this analysis. 
Inflationary effects are negligible. The analysis of the competitive economics is 
carried out in terms of constant US 1975 dollars; thus monetary aspects of the 
energy problem, particularly those associated with eroding creditworthiness, 
are not taken -into account. 
To this list should be added the following two assumptions, which explicitly underlie 
the data used in the scenaiios. 
- A vigorous exploration for new energy resources in Europe is assumed. 
- Economic growth rates are assumed to be moderate and to decline steadily over 
time, though remaining positive. 
By taking into account the quantitative findings of the global scenarios, translated 
to the regional level of the EC, with these assumptions, IIASA developed a set of macro- 
economically consistent energy supply scenarios for the EC countries based on the opti- 
mal allocation of capital, labor, and energy. 
The Method of the Analysis and the Findings 
Adaptations to the rising energy prices of the past decade are sometimes termed 
conservation, sometimes efficiency improvements, and sometimes productivity increases. 
Each of these involves reducing the amount of energy needed to perform some service by 
replacing it withsomething else. In some casesenergy can effectively be replaced by capital 
(e.g. by investingin home insulation); in others by labor (e.g. in tuning an engine to reduce 
its fuel consumption);in still others it may be saved simply by ingenuity or knowhow (e.g. 
by designing more efficient jet engines or new processes in steelmaking, or even just by 
making more carefully planned shopping trips). Thus rearrangements of resources of 
capital, labor, and knowhow can conserve energy, and appropriate investment of these 
resources - in education, research and development, capital equipment, exploratory dril- 
ling - can increase the stock of resources that can be put to use. 
Where the present IIASA analysis differs from previous studies of the EC's energy 
options is in treating energy as a factor of production, just as capital and labor. The 
underlying idea in the IIASAIEC scenarios was to postulate equilibrium conditions for 
the substitution of capital and labor for energy: that is, to arrive at the optimal allocation 
of the three resources. If the marginal productivity of capital and labor is high, then it is 
costly to substitute either of these for energy. This point has important implications, 
since previously proposed technically oriented energy strategies for the EC countries were 
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found to imply a degree of energy conservation and substitution away from oil that does 
not appear economically justified at the oil price levels characteristic of global supply 
opportunities. 
The IIASAIEC study found previous investigations of the European energy future 
to be over-optimistic with regard to economic growth, as well as energy import oppor- 
tunities and conservation potential. In the new IIASAIEC scenarios a substantially lower 
rate of economic growth is projected. 
- - - l IASA High Scenario 
(36 terawatt-years per year globally) 
l l ASA Low Scenario 
(22 terawatt-years per year globally) 
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Energy imports of IIASA Region I11 (Western Europe and Japan) in the two scenarios of the IIASA 
global energy study Energy in a Finite World. The reduced dependence on  oil imports in the high 
scenario is replaced by an increased dependence o n  coal and natural gas imports. In the low economic 
growth scenario oil imports grow more slowly, but  the dependence o n  oil imports extends well into 
the next century with n o  possibility of building alternative fossil systems quickly. 
The study used computer models to simulate energy demand and supply, to balance 
the two over the five decades of the study period, and to examine the long-term macro- 
economic implications of alternative energy supply scenarios. Future energy demand was 
projected by extrapolating demographic, economic, and technical parameters. This 
involved making assumptions about the economic growth rates of the various sectors 
of the EC economy, broken down in the study into the production of goods, freight 
transportation, passenger transportation, households, and the service sector, and then 
further subdivided. Projectionsof energy efficiencies, growth rates, shifts between sectors, 
and energy-related details oflifestyles were then made: extent and means of travel, heating 
requirements, and so on. 
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The next step In the common methodology for both the IIASA global study and 
the Crucial Choices study was to explore the possibilities for providing the required 
amount of fmal energy using available resources and technologies, the central objective 
being to minimize the overall cost of the primary energy forms (e.g. coal, oil, gas, uranium). 
The IIASA global study found a transition in the allocation of energy exports from 
the resource-rich developing countries in Latin America, northern Africa, and the Middle 
East at about the turn of the century. The rest of the developing world (most of Africa 
and southern and southeast Asia) switches from being a net exporter of energy to being a 
net importer. North America, whose oil imports are assumed to decline to zero by this 
time, is thus replaced by the developing countries in competition for oil with the European 
countries and Japan. Over the next few decades, the global scenarios envisage a shift away 
from the present high imports of oil into Western Europe from the OPEC countries to 
high imports of gas and later coal from the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and North 
America. 
One formidable problem in the EC countries will be the provision of liquid fuels 
for transportation and chemical feedstocks; crude-oil-based products alone will be insuf- 
ficient to meet the projected demand. For this reason coal liquefaction to produce 
synthetic fuels was included in the study, on a world scale from the year 2000. Renewable 
resources, as a result of the long lead-times involved, make a relatively small, but none- 
theless important, contribution by 2030. 
For the next half century, fossil fuels will continue to dominate the world's energy 
supply. Global consumption of both gas and oil will actually continue to increase over the 
next fifty years. The two resources will become progressively costlier to produce, how- 
ever, as deep off-shore deposits of oil and deep gas formations are exploited. Furthermore, 
gas and oil will need to be complemented with "dirtier" hydrocarbons such as oil shales 
and tar sands that are also less accessible and more expensive to extract. 
The macroeconomic growth model MACRO was used to cross-check the impact of 
each energy supply strategy on the economic environment in the EC. The macroeconomic 
demand and supply of capital, labor, and energy as a third factor of production were 
balanced and the level of economic growth determined. This cross-check revealed serious 
inconsistencies in the Crucial Choices scenarios between the evolution of energy demand 
and the equilibrium energy cost. That is, the energy conservation effects assumed in the 
study are inconsistent with the energy cost level calculated to correspond to the expansion 
in demand. 
These energy costlenergy utility considerations lead to the central question of the 
extent to which the energy problem might obstruct an otherwise feasible economic evolu- 
tion in the EC, and the corollary question of whether the energy sector should be isolated 
from the rest of the economy and stabilized through transfer payments. There are clearly 
conflicting objectives involved in restructuring the energy system while coping at the 
same time with soaring import costs and declining general economic growth. 
A modification to the scenario writing procedure was introduced to produce two 
new IIASAIEC scenarios. In the new approach, labor productivity and labor force partic- 
ipation rates are determined exogenously and serve as inputs to the models, which then 
calculate economic growth projections internally by clearing markets for capital, labor, 
and energy. In this way a macroeconomically consistent demand scenario was developed 
and used to investigate the trade-offbetween increased domestic investment and increased 
energy 
6 W. Sassin, A. Holzl, H.-H. Rogner, L. Schrattenholzer 
Solar + 
m 
L 
0) 
C -- 
Oil 
W d 
1980  1990  2 0 0 0  2010  2 0 2 0  2030  
Year 
The EC Acceptable Dependence energy supply case from the Crucial Choices study: primary energy 
inputs calculated in 1980 for the European Communities on the basis of optimistic assumptions about 
economic performance, technological advance, and extended energy trade. HTR, high temperature 
reactor; FBR, fast breeder reactor; LWR, light water reactor. This reference scenario balances the roles 
of fossil fuels and nuclear energy and rests on  a rather strong energy conservation trend. 
Reference / case 
Year 
Evolution of the net GDP of  the EC countries in the 1980 reference case and the newly designed 
balanced macroeconomic growth case for the EC. For this latter case a "nuclear" and a "coal" version 
were compared. 
Two alternative future energy supply paths were then analyzed to define the range 
of technological choices open to the EC countries in a medium- to long-term future of 
low economic growth. One is characterized by the assumption of favorable capital costs 
for nuclear energy (the Nuclear Scenario); the second has rather higher costs for nuclear 
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energy, thus favoring coal technologies (the Coal Scenario). The GDP growth rates in the 
two scenarios are almost identical, decliningfrom an average of 2.2% per year (1985-2000) 
to 1.1% (2015-2030), but resources are found to be allocated quite differently. Energy 
import costs roughly double between 1980 and 2030, with a dependence of about 28% 
on imports in the Nuclear Scenario. The figure in the Coal Scenario is about 39%. 
In the Nuclear Scenario coal consumption drops off substantially by 2000-2010. 
Coal in effect fills the electricity generating gap until there is sufficient nuclear capacity 
available to meet demand. In the long term the role of coal is as a raw material for lique- 
faction to produce synfuels. In the Coal Scenario coal production was increased to permit 
a more limited introduction of nuclear power, and in particular to delay the deployment 
of advanced nuclear reactors. The introduction of advanced nuclear reactors is thus delayed 
beyond 2030. The consumption of uranium is actually higher in the Coal Scenario owing 
to the later introduction of advanced reactors and the consequent greater utilization of 
600 
Uses of coal in scenarios favoring (a) nuclear and (b) coal technologies respectively. The liquid fuel 
market is hardly affected by this variation. 
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light water reactors. In fact, the world's uranium resources, which are in energy termsthe 
rough equivalent of global oil reserves, are almost exhausted in the Coal Scenario, raising 
the possibility of future energy crises arising from uranium shortages. 
In both cases the energy sector charges against the rest of the economy. In the 
Nuclear Scenario the economy is more capital intensive owing to  the build-up of an ad- 
vanced nuclear infrastructure. Reactors consuming enriched uranium are projected to be 
replaced with advanced reactors well within the fifty-year study period. The fact that the 
earth's resources of uranium are almost exhausted in this scenario emphasizes the impor- 
tance of high temperature reactors, which can also use thorium as an energy source. 
Nuclear 
Scenario 
Coal 
Scenario 
Year 
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Thedifferent effectson the energy import dependence and the trade balance in the macroeconomically 
balanced Coal and Nuclear Scenarios. 
Coal 
Scenario 
Nuclear 
Scenario 
The two responses, the Coal Scenario and the Nuclear Scenario, impede economic 
growth fairly equally on the basis of the costs assumed. It makes little difference whether 
the same amount of energy is provided from indigenous sources or by increasingimports 
and running trade deficits. 
An assessment of the two scenarios in terms of two tentative EC policy goals of 
limiting import dependence and the dependence on any single primary energy source 
shows that in 2030 coal provides 35% of primary energy supplied in the Coal Scenario 
and nuclear energy 34% of primary energy in the Nuclear Scenario. This indicates the im- 
portance of advanced reactors in replacing energy imports if energy self-sufficiency be- 
comes a primary goal. 
The two scenarios thus chart the extremes between which the path of future energy 
development can be chosen. The fact that this fairly narrow choice is based on an optimis- 
tic view of the availability of primary energy, assuming free market access to world 
energy resources and consistent world energy trade, highbghts the technological flexibility 
the EC countries must develop to be able to respond to changes on international energy 
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markets. The choice of emphasis between coal and nuclear energy is a critical one, requiring 
decisions and adjustments well in advance of implementation. There are other alternatives 
that must be kept in view, such as the liquefaction of natural gas and its transport over 
large distances. Still further options, such as nuclear fusion and centralized solar energy, are 
beyond the time horizon of the study. The scenarios that have been developed thus map an 
area of maneuverability for energy R&D strategies: they link energy policy goals and 
likely technological achievements with broad European and world evolutions, and, in view 
of the optimistic "stable globe" hypothesis, they represent best-case strategies for Europe. 
General economic growth, the dependence on oil imports, and the nuclear power build- 
up a]-e all directly linked; alternative energy sources will not provide niuch more flexibility 
before 2000. This means that any developments that further restrict maneuverability 
will necessitate greater improvements in productivity, further exploitation of resources, 
a higher import dependence, or lower economic and social aspirations. 
The macroeconomic model that determines the most productive use of capital, 
labor, and energy indicates that conservation may not be a reasonable way of stabilizing 
the international balance of demand and supply: in all the scenarios it was found that saving 
one unit of energy reduced the GDP by about five times the economic value of the 
conserved energy unit. That is, reducing the energy input into the EC economy by sub- 
stituting highly productive capital or labor reduces the GDP by far more than the value of 
the energy conserved. 
Conclusions 
The goal of the study was to investigate the implications of the findings of IIASA's 
global energy study for the countries of the European Communities. No optimal energy 
strategy has been identified. Indeed, the European energy problem cannot be solved by 
considering the energy sector in isolation and seeking to design technical or technoeconomic 
solutions. The energy problem must be seen to be part of a more comprehensive challenge 
fazing Europe that demands a flexibility of response in technology, in economic develop- 
mcnt, in international cooperation, and inlifestyle adaptations, to temper regional interests 
in order to bring global energy demand and supply into balance. 
If the EC countries want to achieve a measure of independence from the increasingly 
uncertain development of international energy relations, a policy of building up internal 
supply capacity should be investigated, even at production cost levels well above current 
international energy prices. This policy could be tested using the scenarios to determine 
the sensitivity of the EC countries to fluctuations in global conditions governing its access 
to external energy resources. Supplies could be supplemented by energy imports that in a 
case of classical resource shortage would not automatically be in demand in other indus- 
trialized regions. Uranium and low quality coal might be suitable, but this would presup- 
pose independent European technological programs that differ from R&D programs for 
resource exploitation in the rest of the developed world. 
Traditional economic cost-minimizing principles will never, against a background of 
rising energy costs, stimulate the technological innovation needed to take Europe up to 
the energy transition. Furthermore, the less rewarding the basis on which the old infra- 
structure operates, the slower is the rate at which a new and even less rewarding energy 
system can be introduced. This means that the transition to a sustainable energy system is 
likely to become more difficult the longer it is postponed, in which case time also becomes 
limited and precious. 
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ABSTRACT 
Under a contract from the Commission of the European Communities, the linkage 
between the energy problem and the national R&D strategies of the EC countries was 
investigated in the light of the results of IIASAS long-term global energy study, docu- 
mented in Energy in a Finite World (1981). By considering what may be feasible over the 
next fifty years in other industrialized world regions, substantial discordance is revealed 
between the desires of the EC countries for economic growth, energy conservation, and 
energy imports, and the need for a global balance between energy demand and supply. 
A way of gradually harmonizing regional energy strategies with the constraints on 
resources and techrlologies identified in the IIASA global scenarios has been developed. 
The two alternative scenarios developed are based on a macroeconomically optimal alloca- 
tion of capital, manpower, and energy. Given the limited oil imports of the EC in IIASA 's 
global projections, two limiting scenarios are presented to indicate the narrow technolog- 
ical choice in a medium- to long-term future for the EC countries of low economic growth. 
The two scenarios have either coal or nuclear power as the favored energy option, supple- 
mented by the other source. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of the present study was to translate the results of IIASA's globally 
comprehensive investigation of the long-term energy problem to an intermediate level - 
the level of the European Communities. Globally compatible energy strategies were com- 
pared with potential energy strategies reflecting the preferences of the member countries 
of the European Communities. Alternative strategies can be devised when such compari- 
sons reveal significant discrepancies between a bottom-up approach (Western Europe's 
view of the world) and a top-down approach (the world's view of Western Europe). Devel- 
oping an alternative European energy strategy capable of harmonizing regional and global 
outlooks allows us to assess the impacts of external constraints and limitations on the 
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evolution of European energy technologies and to design resilient energy R&D strategies. 
In more general terms: once translations from the global level to the EC level are consistently 
quantified, the prospects for Europe of coping with the energy problem in a competitive 
world context can be assessed against a neutral global yardstick. 
We note here that the methodology developed and applied under this contract could 
also be used to interlink the aggregate intermediate level of the EC and each of its nine 
(at the time of this study) member countries. Investigations of thls kind were not under- 
taken under this contract, however. 
The report summarizes the collaborative work of the services of the European Com- 
mission and the Energy Systems Program of IIASA in several blocks. Each block comprises 
a problem-oriented investigation and the direct results obtained within the confines of the 
question that guided each particular investigation. Figure 1.1 lists these blocks arranged in 
the order of the work. The evolution of the scenarios, their relative divergence, and the 
steps taken to harmonize the EC outlook with the IIASA global scenarios used as a yard- 
stick are thus self-evident from the figure; in fact, Figure 1.1 represents a learning process. 
The short-term European energy problem was caused by the recent dramatic 
changes in world energy markets. Reactions to this imported problem clearly have to  con- 
centrate first on appropriate technical adjustments within the energy system;here improved 
energy efficiencies, energy conservation, and the utilization of alternative indigenous and 
extraneous supplies are foremost. 
At a later stage of the investigation it became obvious that the long-term European 
energy problem will have a distinct home-made aspect. In time, Europe's ability to adapt 
the structure of the productive and consumptive parts of its economy to a new energy 
supply situation will substantially influence the nature of its energy problem. Questions 
of labor productivity, savings rates and balance of payments problems, and substitution 
between capital, labor, and energy increasingly influence energy scenarios. Ultimately the 
EC study and the IIASA/EC study together produced a set of nine scenarios. These vary 
basically in their projections of energy-consuming and energy-producing technologies, and 
in some parameters describing general economic evolution. 
All the scenarios are biased with regard to one principal assumption: smooth evolu- 
tion. The various data inputs, whether technical or economic parameters, and the contin- 
uation of present decision criteria (e.g. cost minimization, limitations on import depen- 
dence, absence of new cartels) assume a stable and cooperating world. The possibility of 
discontinuities, in the form of changes in certain constraints or decision criteria within 
the time horizon of the study, is excluded. The internal stability of the model calculations 
is largely a consequence of this basic assumption. For this reason alone the scenarios could 
not be taken as predictions of the future. Furthermore, none of the scenarios implies a 
balanced set of economic and technical assumptions. Instead of covering likely evolutions, 
each scenario tries to take one single substrategy to its credible limits in order to explore 
its problem solving potential. Thus, to a limited extent, the interplay of the energy prob- 
lem with other evolutions can be traced. Throughout the study, in fact, the energy prob- 
lem has always been understood as part of a more comprehensive challenge to  Europe, 
requiring a flexible response in the fields of technology, economic development, lifestyle 
adaptation, and also international relations. Certain aspects of this challenge are gauged in 
this particular methodological approach when a balance between demand and supply of 
energy has to be achieved in each scenario. Thus, all the scenarios taken together map an 
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FIGURE 1.1 Schematic diagram of the IIASAIEC Study. 
area of future maneuverability. It is on this basis that energy R&D strategies must be 
assessed. Though limited by the assumption of a stable and cooperating world, the set of 
scenarios interlinks particular energy R&D goals and eventual technological achievements 
with a broader set of European and world evolutions. 
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Should the goals be set too low or should the actual deployment of energy technol- 
ogies fall short of the levels assumed in the scenarios, the area of maneuverability defined 
by the variations in the set of assumptions would necessarily become even smaller. The 
problem would then become one of further improving capital and labor productivity, of 
exploiting resources so far conserved, of political compensation for import dependence, 
and of lowering economic and social aspirations. 
In line with the main objective of the study - to  translate the findings of IIASA's 
global energy analysis to the level of the European Communities - no optimal energy 
strategy for Europe has been identified. In view of the crucial hypothesis of a stable and 
cooperating global system, the scenarios in this report essentially outline best-case energy 
strategies for Europe. We hope that our study will form a cornerstone for further work 
that would fix strategic R&D goals for energy, taking due account of the uncertainties of 
the real world - competing and potentially unstable. 
2 GLOBAL ENERGY PERSPECTIVES AND THE EC OUTLOOK 
The point of departure for the study was the two sets of future scenarios that evolved 
from two separate analytical efforts. The Energy Systems Program Group of IIASA com- 
pleted in 1979 a high and a low global scenario, encompassing a range of possible evolu- 
tions of the global balance of energy demand and supply. The IIASA scenarios assess real- 
istic possibilities for developing the energy systems of seven distinct and globally compre- 
hensive world regions by referring to an exceptionally favorable state of world affairs - 
stable and cooperating by definition - over the next fifty years (Hafele 1981). 
At the same time, a working group from the EC, the International Energy Agency 
(IEA), and IIASA finished the firstever quantification of the long-term energy future of 
the EC. The EC results were formulated as five alternative scenarios in Crucial Choices for 
the Energy Transition (Commission of the European Communities 1980). The two 
sets of scenarios use the same types of formalized computer models and draw partly on 
identical or related data bases, but they focus on different aspects of the energy problem. 
The quantitative results, and more so the conclusions of both sets of scenarios, do 
not fully coincide. Rather, conflicting strategies can be elicited from the two sets of sce- 
narios. This is not unreasonable, since the objectives of a national or in our case an EC 
energy strategy do not necessarily conform with the need of an interlinked global system 
for the consistent evolution of its constituent parts. 
2.1 The Methodological Approach 
Before the main results of both studies are summarized, a brief outline of the com- 
mon methodology is given. It enables us to  specify which objectives and which activities 
eventually shape a particular energy strategy. The methodology also to some extent de- 
termines future perspectives: it reduces the many aspects of potential evolutions to those 
aspects that can be quantified using today's comprehensive national and international 
statistical services. 
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Figure 2.1 specifies the elements of a set of computer models capable of producing 
a balance between demand and supply of energy over several decades. The computer 
models need quantitative inputs. Some of these inputs relate to future evolutions in energy- 
related fields. Depending on the sequence of model operations, these inputs either act as 
driving variables representing prescribed objectives or assume the function of strategic ele- 
ments contributing to the solution of the energy problem. 
World regional energy Consistency Objectives and projection 
models checks of structural information 
consumers 
\ 
Energy 
demand 
Energy in the 
G DP intersectoral 
exchange 
-
Energy exchange 
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consumption/savings ratio; 
elasticities of production 
factors 
FIGURE 2.1 Model elements for generating scenarios of the European energy future. 
Future economic growth assumed the role of a normative (prescribed) driving force 
in both the global and the EC analyses. Its evolution as presently foreseen, together with 
projections of demographic growth and technical changes in lifestyles (expressed as struc- 
tural changes between the main sectors of the economy and predicted changes in the energy 
intensity of each sector), determine the demand for final energy. The projected lifestyle 
changes imply a broad spectrum of policy actions aimed at energy conservation. Whether 
these actions will be economically justified by energy price increases, or whether their 
side effects will accumulate t o  present insurmountable obstacles to conservation are, and 
will remain, open questions. At this point, informed judgment is the only means of con- 
fining the set of technical lifestyle adjustments within a reasonable overall evolution. 
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Such judgment is aided, however, by comparing the effects of different lifestyle changes 
and consumer technologies on the spectrum and time evolution of final energy forms. 
Alternative demand scenarios were explored at different stages of both analyses and 
gradually converged to "middle-of-the-road" paths. It is important to note that such 
exercises quickly show diminishing returns for energy conservation that results from ex- 
treme lifestyle prescriptions. 
The second distinct step in the methodology of Figure 2.1 is to consider the al- 
ternatives for providing the amount of final energy demanded using available resources 
and production and conversion technologies. The overall minimum cost for the total 
energy supply over the fifty years considered is the central objective in the allocation 
of primary energy forms. The macroeconomic rationale is to impose the least possible 
burden on the economy as a whole. Energy trade with other world regions enriches the 
potential supply patterns. 
To arrive at a global supply balance, the IIASA approach introduces self-sufficiency 
objectives for some world regions and a maximum earnings strategy for oil exports from 
the Middle East and northern Africa. These strategy provisos necessarily lead to cost dif- 
ferentials for regional energy availability. (This consistency problem disappears for quan- 
titative reasons in most of the IIASA world regions.) Again, judgment is needed to weigh 
the benefits of regional independence against the concomitant elevated internal costs. 
Fundamentally different conditions obtain for the EC, however. The extremely 
unfavorable position with regard to fossil resources suggests introducing into the supply 
allocation procedure limits to the availability of primary energy forms; at the same time, 
minimizing vulnerability suggests setting upper bounds for overall import dependence. 
The narrow resource base, together with supply policy constraints, largely determines the 
supply allocation of the EC. Energy costs have only a marginal influence in this stage of 
the balancing procedure for the EC. 
A crucial feedback'between the output of the resource allocation model and the in- 
puts to the demand model of the first step results from an assessment of how the resource 
situation changes over the course of time. 
Figure 2.2 summarizes the main judgmental interventions that shaped the process 
of scenario writing for the long-term global evolution. This figure specifies the formalized 
models and the particular consistency checks behind the two scenarios for IIASA's world 
regions: the global High Scenario and the global Low Scenario. Both these comprise 
distinct scenarios for each of the seven world regions that were considered. Figure 2.2 is 
thus a particular implementation of the methodology shown in Figure 2.1. The outstand- 
ing problem of this global scenario writing process was the interplay between the deple- 
tion of fossil fuel resources and overall global economic development. Three phases of 
"reactions" to the quantitative responses of the models led to corrections to initially fined 
objectives or to  estimates of evolutionary trends. Firstly, unconventional fossil as well as 
renewable resources and, secondly, enhanced energy conservation were introduced in con- 
secutive feedback loops. Eventually, substantially reduced economic growth had to be 
ccnsidered in view of the aggregate estimates of technologically accessible energy resources. 
The objective in balancing energy demand and supply in the five EC scenarios was 
different from that in the two IIASA global scenarios. Whereas the IIASA study tried to 
determint: the possible overall evolution of the global energy system, the EC study focused 
on technological responses of the EC to an energy problem that was assumed to remain 
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within the energy sector. The methodology of Figure 2.1 is flexible enough to  cover these 
different strategic emphases. However, the implementation of the scenario writing process 
in the Oucial Choices study (Commission of the European Communities 1980) led to dif- 
ferent decision patterns. Figure 2.3 records the conflicting policy variables "technological 
preference" and "energy import dependence limit" in the feedback loop connecting the 
output of the energy supply model and the inputs of the energy demand model, as well as 
the normative constraints to the supply model. These latter constraints reflect the esti- 
mated conditions on global energy markets, to the extent that they affect the EC. 
A comparison of Figures 2.2 and 2.3 reveals that the conceptual differences in the 
studies of the global and the EC energy problem were mainly confined to these judgmental 
adjustments in the respective feedback loops. The twofold concerns dominating the EC 
scenario writing process partly explain why five EC scenarios were developed but only 
two scenarios in IIASA's study of the global evolution. 
The common methodology of both studies (see Figure 2.1) contains a third stage. It 
is designed to  assess the impacts of the energy sector operations, balanced in the preceding 
two stages of demand and supply modeling, in terms of macroeconomic relationships. In 
principle, such impacts allow the introduction of alternative feedback loops connecting 
the macroeconomic level and the microeconomic level of either energy consumers or 
energy suppliers. Such feedbacks have not been incorporated to yield alternative scenarios, 
either in the global analysis by IIASA or in the Crucial Choices study. Instead, changes in 
macroeconomic parameters have been monitored for both sets of scenarios. They can be 
interpreted as provisos to be fulfilled by institutional and political adjustments to the 
perceived energy problem. 
For the global study, the changes in the industrial structure of each world region as 
a consequence of constructing the energy supply system were an important concern. Con- 
sequently, investment requirements, both direct and indirect, and manpower and materials 
balances were calculated. These provide a basis for judging the plausibility of the driving 
assumptions on economic growth and structural change that influence the energy demand 
projections. However, no modifications to the scenario writing process were made on the 
basis of the significant macroeconomic changes identified. 
In contrast to the global study, considerations of energy investments in relation to 
total capital investment rates and import bills for energy were in the forefront of this 
monitoring phase of the EC study. This is a direct consequence of the high energy import 
dependence and the need for an early and quick modification of the existing EC energy 
supply system. Again, macroeconomic evolutions and changes of present macrocharacter- 
istics were monitored for the five EC scenarios that resulted from the procedures shown 
in Figure 2.3, but no iterative modification of the scenarios was made in the EC study. 
After this brief description of the general approach and the specific objectives of 
the two independent analytical efforts, it should be pointed out that the differing evolu- 
tions of the energy systems in the seven scenarios that existed at the start of this contract 
study must be seen as being the answers to different questions. The quantitative details 
are summarized briefly in sections 2.2 and 2.3. 
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2.2 The Potential Evolution of Industrialized Countries with Scarce Energy Resources 
in the IIASA Global Scenarios 
The nine countries of the EC are included in IIASA's World Region 111, which is a 
conglomeration of highly developed industrialized countries, basically the OECD group 
without the USA and Canada. Figure 2.4 identifies Region 111 and the other IIASA world 
regions. Japan and most of the countries of northern and southern Europe are in a position 
similar to that of the EC countries with regard to their medium- and long-term energy 
problems, and consequently have been treatedin parallel by IIASA. The economic growth 
rates of all regions are given in Table 2.1 for the IIASA High and Low Scenarios. The 
MEDEE model (Khan and Holzl 1980; LapiUonne 1978) calculations for Region I11 result 
in the demand spectra for secondary energy shown in Figures 2.5 and 2.6. On the basis of 
the estimated global availability of energy resources, the MESSAGE model (see Appendix) 
Region I (NA! North America 
Region I I (SUIE E) Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 
Region I l l  (WEIJANZ) Western Europe, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, 
South Africa, and Israel 
Region IV (LA) Latin America 
Region V (Af/SEA) Africa (except northern Africa and South Africa), 
south and south-east Asia 
Region VI  (MEINAf) Middle East and northern Africa 
[ Region V I I (CICPA) China and centrally planned Asian economies 
FIGURE 2.4 The seven world regions analyzed in the IIASA global energy study. 
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allocates a cost-optimal primary energy supply to Region 111, which draws heavily on 
energy imports. Figures 2.7 and 2.8 show the contributions of coal, oil, gas, nuclear 
power, and renewable energy resources to  meeting the needs of Region 111. 
Figure 2.9 specifies the energy imports and exports of Region 111 in relation to the 
other oil-trading world regions. An abrupt transition in the allocation of energy exports 
from the resource-rich developing countries of Region IV (Latin America) and Region V 
(the Middle East and northern Africa) at about the turn of the century is forecast in both 
the IIASA scenarios. At this time Region V (central Africa, southern Asia, and parts of 
southeast Asia) switches from being a net exporter of energy to being a net energy 
importer. The present oil buying competition between Region I (North America) and 
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LWR, light water reactor; FBR, fast breeder reactor. 
Region 111 (Western Europe, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and Israel) 
would presumably then be succeeded by competition between Region I11 and Region V. 
If Region I does not succeed in reducing its oil imports essentially to zero by this time, the 
con~petition between developed and developing countries for imported oil could become 
even sharper. The timing of the expected transition differs by only a few years in the 
High Scenario and in the Low Scenario. 
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The total import dependence of RegionIII, including coal and gas imports, is shown 
in Figure 2.10. The main features of the evolving supply system of Region 111 are clearly a 
shift from the strong dependence on oil imported from the OPEC countries to  an equally 
strong dependence on coal and gas originating from North America, Eastern Europe, and 
the Soviet Union. Neither EC imports, nor imports into Japan, from Australia and South 
Africa show up in the import volumes of Region 111; Australia, South Africa, and Norway 
are included in Region 111, and consequently their resources contribute t o  the indigenous 
production ofthis region, even when these are traded between countries within the region. 
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TABLE 2.1 Projections of gross domestic product growth influenced by the energy problem: the IIASA High and Low 
Scenarios. Note: all growth rates are average annual growth rates (rounded) over the time period shown;actual projections 
show declining growth rates. 
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FIGURE 2.10 Energy imports of Region 111 in the IIASA High and Low Scenarios. 
Table 2.1 and Figures 2.5-2.10 quantify possible evolutions of the energy systems 
of a larger group of countries than just those members of the EC. It is repeated here that 
any assessment or any comparison with projections by or for the EC has to take note of 
the objectives that guided the development of these scenarios; these objectives have been 
outlined earlier in the comparative description of the methodological approach. Readers 
desiring more information are referred to the specific details reported in the 850-page 
reference volume of the IIASA study, Energy in a Finite World (Energy Systems Program 
Group of IIASA 1981). 
2.3 The Long-Term EC Energy Scenarios 
Starting from demographic projections together with projections concerning labor 
markets, a high and a low economic growth path were identified for the EC. These projec- 
tions include extrapolations of labor productivity and trends observed before 1975, as 
well as judgments on long-term economic saturation effects. In Figure 2.1 1 a high and a 
low growth path of gross domestic product (GDP) are given. They embrace a range of 
possible developments that were considered feasible in the light of the interdependence of 
labor markets and macroeconomic outputs observed in the past behavior of the EC eco- 
nomies. Together with projections of technological changes in the various consuming sec- 
tors of the EC economies, the high and the low economic growth paths translate into 
alternative evolutions of final energy demand (Figure 2.12). Iriitially moderate and later 
high energy conservation rates were combined with the high economic growth path, 
whereas the low economic growth path assumed a high degree of conservation from the 
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FIGURE 2.1 1 Growth of the grossdomesticproduct of the EC, alternative cases. Source: Commission 
of the European Communities (1980). 
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FIGURE 2.12 Evolutions of EC final energy demand. Source: Commission of the European Com- 
munities (1980). 
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base year 1975 onward. As a result of the difficulties encountered during the analytical 
efforts to meet these demands within technical and policy constraints on the energy supply 
system of the EC, two further demand cases were subsequently added. These are also 
shown in Figure 2.12. Here the energy savings through conservation efforts in the high 
growth case are augmented by a slower growth in energy demand due to a reduction in the 
economic growth potential beyond the year 2000. The various cases combine alternative 
technological strategies, i.e. projections of more or less successful deployment of the various 
energy supply chains, together with invariably optimistic estimates of indigenous resources 
and import quantities of oil, gas, coal, and uranium. However, normative assumptions 
about the maximum tolerable overall dependence on energy imports, as well as about a 
balanced relationship between the contributions of individual primary energy forms, ap- 
peared necessary in order to limit the strain on the supply technologies. Of the five cases 
that were ultimately quantified, Case IIa is of particular importance. I t  is termed the 
Acceptable Dependence Case to  underline the fact that it provides for a balanced energy 
supply system, complying with the two assumed policy goals of the EC of a maximum 
dependence on energy imports of less than 50% and a limit to  the contribution of any 
one primary energy carrier of 30% of the total supply. The price of this balanced supply 
is a reduced economic growth potential and a high energy conservation requirement. The 
supply structure of this case is given in Figure 2.13. A careful analysis of the different 
scenarios reveals the lack of flexibility in a policy of compensating for delays in the de- 
ployment of any one energy source by drawing more heavily on an alternative source. In 
fact, the allocation of energy sources in the EC scenarios is determined only to a very 
small degree by energy price or cost relationships. Instead, the system is determined by 
the fixed economic goals and the total set of constraints that characterize the EC resource 
situation, by import expectations, and also by the economic structure and its maximum 
adjustment rate. Most crucially, these severe constraints arise despite comparatively high 
technical conservation projections and a rather optimistic assessment of energy imports 
with regard to both quantities and prices. 
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Year 
FIGURE 2.1 3 EC Acceptable Dependence energy supply case. Source: Commission of the European 
Communities ( 1  980). 
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3 A COMPARISON OF THE GLOBAL AND THE EC SCENARIOS 
To repeat here what was said in section 2.1, the IIASA scenarios and the EC scenarios 
must be seen as answers to different questions. Nevertheless, these answers do have a 
common basis. They derive from identical models and from data sets that are used in 
both analyses. Moreover, as the EC energy system constitutes a substantial part of the 
global energy system, it directly influences the "exogenous" conditions of the global 
energy markets subject to which EC energy strategies are formulated. The quantities of 
energy imported under such strategies must always fit into the global balance, taking ac- 
count of the preparedness of all producers to export and the abilities of all consumers to 
import. The position of a group of countries such as the EC within the global energy trade 
pattern is not determined solely by energy price levels, either in reality or in the formalized 
scenario writing procedures. An economy, depending on the efficiency with which it can 
convert energy into marketable commodities, will be able to command a larger or smaller 
share of the limited global energy supply over a period of time. This would cause a 
correspondingly more or less severe energy problem elsewhere in the world, however. 
A careful comparison of the global scenarios of the IIASA and the EC scenarios 
provides a first-order evaluation of the extent to  which the estimates of realizable iinport 
volumes and conservation potentials in the EC scenarios described in section 2.3 indirectly 
rely on "exporting" the energy problem. 
In order to draw such a comparison, it was necessary to  disaggregate the IIASA 
Region 111, i.e. the OECD countries excluding the USA and Canada, into the EC countries 
and a group comprising the remaining countries of Region 111. For many reasons, the de- 
mand and supply pattern of the respective IIASA scenarios for Region 111 cannot just be 
disaggregated according to any fixed parameter ratios. Instead, two subscenarios had to 
be developed, specifyiilg the possible evolution of the EC, in the first instance within the 
set of asssumptions determining the IIASA High Scenario, and in the second within those 
of the IIASA Low Scenario. For this process of scenario writing, the basic methodology of 
Figure 2.1 was implemented in a specialized form. It deviates distinctly from the iterative 
procedure outlined in Figure 2.2. Figure 3.1 indicates the main steps of disaggregation that 
led to the two scenarios, labeled IIASA/EC High and Low. The hypothesis needed to  
"allocate the global energy problem" between the EC countries and the other countries 
of Region 111 relates to the relative economic growth potentials of these two competing 
groups of industrialized countries. In line with the energy conservation assumptions in the 
IIASA scenarios for Region 111, structural evolutions for the different economic sectors 
were fixed in order to ensure comparable overall economic energy elasticities for both 
subregions as well as to conform to the fixed aggregate gross domestic product (GDP) 
evolution and final energy demand figures for Region 111. The details of this step are ex- 
plained in section 3.1.1. 
The determination of the supply parts of the IIASA/EC High and Low Scenarios 
involved less additional normative information. Here the ambiguities reside more or less in 
the allocation of the oil import volumes for Region 111 and in the availability of uranium. 
The allocation can mainly be assessed through the resulting total supply pattern for the 
two subregions. The tendency was to  select a more favorable allocation for the EC, driving 
the other Region 111 countries into a faster nuclear build-up and higher coal utilization 
shares than the EC. The resulting supply scenarios are specified in section 3.1.2. 
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FIGURE 3.1 The process of scenario writing: IIASA/EC High and Low Scenarios. 
The availability of top-down scenarios, here the IIASAIEC scenarios, and the bottom- 
up scenarios of Oucial Choices for the Energy Transition (Commission of the European 
Communities 1980) allowed a direct comparison of the projections of different state 
variables. The substantial discrepancies are explained in section 3.2. 
3.1 The EC as a Subregion of the Global Energy System 
3.1.1 The Evolution of  Final Energy Demand 
The main features of the IIASA scenarios are summarized in section 2.1. The scenar- 
ios are described in more detail in Part IV of Energy in a Finite World. Regional disaggrega- 
tion had to  be limited in that study: the presently developed market economies (mostly 
OECD countries) were divided into just two sets, namely Region I (North America) and 
Region I11 (OECD countries excluding North America, together with a few non-OECD 
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FIGURE 3.2 The distribution of GDP per capitain 1975 for Region Ill and subregions. Source: OECD 
(1979a). 
countries such as Yugoslavia, South Africa, and Israel). Naturally, Region I11 is a very 
inhomogeneous set of countries, geographically, politically, and economically. A further 
subdivision singling out EC countries distinguishes three groups for the final demand 
assessment: EC, the member countries of the European Communities in 1975; OWE 
(other Western European countries); and OR3 (other Region I11 countries). Figure 3.2 
shows the distribution of GDP per capita in 1975 for these groups. The ranges are 
US$2600-7400* for the EC, US$900-8500 for OWE, and US$1200-6300 for OR3. 
Although this subdivision reduces the geographical and political inhomogeneity, the 
disparity in terms of economic development remains in all three subregions, but especially 
in OWE. 
*All monetary units in this report are given in US dollars at 1975 prices and calculated using 1975 ex- 
change rates. 
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The population projections for the three subregions are shown in Figure 3.3. They 
were supplied by Keyfitz (1977) on a country-by-country basis. The aggregate corresponds 
to the population evolution used in the scenarios for Region 111. Although the population 
of Region 111 is expected to increase from 560 million in 1975 to 767 million by 2030, 
this Region's proportion of world population decreases from 19% to 10%. Within Region 
111, the EC shows the lowest rate of population growth, with an expected increase in 
population from 258 million in 1975 (46% of Region 111) to 304 million by 2030 (40% of 
Region 111). The potential labor force - i.e. the percentage of the population between 
fifteen and sixty-four years old - remains fairly constant in the EC (64%) and OR3 
(65%), but increases in OWE from 61% in 1975 to 66% by 2030. 
Region I I I - total 
Year 
FIGURE 3.3 Population projections for Region 111 and subregions. Source: Keyfitz (1979). 
The gross domestic product (GDP) growth projections were originally estimated not 
for each country individually but for the OECD countries (excluding North America) in 
aggregate. Figure 3.4 shows the evolution of the GDP shares of the three subregions in the 
total GDP of Region 111 between 1963 and 1977. The share of the EC declined steadily 
from 65% to  57%, and that of OWE remained almost constant (16-17%), while OR3 - 
which is dominated by Japan - increased its share from 18% to 26%. The different eco- 
nomic growth potentials of the past are llkely to persist into the future; at  least, there are 
no straightforward arguments suggesting a reversal of such trends. The contributions of 
the subregions to the total economic output of Region I11 were therefore assumed to 
change in accordance with the overall growth potential of each region. Transition matrices 
were estimated both from observations for the whole period 1963-1 977 and from obser- 
vations for 1968-1 977. 
The projected increase in the total GDP of IIASA's Region 111, from US(1975)$2400 
billion in 1975 to US(1975)$11,700 billion in 2030 (High Scenario), translates into a 
decline in the GDP share of the EC from 57% to  46% (using a transition matrix based on 
the period 1963--1977) or from 57% to 5 1% (using a transition matrix based on the period 
1968-1977). Because of Japan's heavy reliance on raw material imports and exports of 
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manufactured goods, and the difficulties expected in the future in these areas, it was 
considered reasonable to choose the latter matrix for the projections. This implies a con- 
tinuation of higher growth in Japan than in other Region I11 countries, but a considerably 
less favorable development than that suggested by the evolution in the early 1960s. 
On comparing the GDP growth assumptions of the EC High (H) and Low (L) Sce- 
narios in CZucial Choices for the Energy Transition (Commission of the European Com- 
munities, 1980) with the IIASA High Scenario projections for Region I11 (see Figure 3.5), 
it turns out that the IIASA High Scenario for Region I11 is close to the EC low growth 
scenario (Case IV). This discrepancy points either to pessimism in the IIASA scenarios or 
to substantial optimism in the EC scenarios. 
Figure 3.6 shows the GDP growth rates for the IIASAIEC cases derived from the 
IIASA Region 111 projections. These are reasonably consistent with the growth rates pro- 
jected for the other IIASA regions, but they seem hardly acceptable on a national level. 
Nevertheless, these low economic growth rates were considered necessary in order to 
match energy demand and supply on a global level. 
Tables 3.1-3.3 summarize the GDP growth projections for Region I11 and those 
derived for the EC. Between 1975 and 2030 the GDP of Region I11 increases by a factor 
of 2.8-4.9, and that of the EC by a factor of 2.5-4.2. On a per capita basis, however, the 
EC would still have a slightly higher GDP growth rate than other Region 111 countries. 
For an assessment of energy demand, in addition to the evolution of total GDP, the 
growth rates of various sectors have to be projected. Within the framework of MEDEE-2, 
the sectoral breakdown of energy demand is as follows (for a summary description of 
MEDEE-2 see Chateau and Lapillonne 1977; Lapillonne 1978; and Khan and Holzl 1980): 
- production of goods 
- freight transportation 
- passenger transportation 
- households 
- service sector. 
The goods-producing sector is further divided into 
- agriculture 
- construction 
- industry (excluding energy producers) 
- energy producers (for accounting purposes only; their energy demand is not 
treated in MEDEE-2). 
Within agriculture and construction, the essential energy demand is for motor fuel; 
electricity and thermal energy use are not generally very significant in these sectors. 
Industries (excluding energy producers) are classified into three categories, namely 
industries producing predominantly 
- basic materials 
- machinery and equipment 
- nondurable goods. 
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FIGURE 3.6 Historical and projected GDP growth rates. 
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TABLE 3.1 AnnualGDP of IIASAIEC and IIASA Region 111,1975-2030. 
GDP (thousand billion US(1975) dollars) 
1975 1985 2000 2015 2030 
High Scenario 
Region I11 2.4 3.6 6 .O 8.7 11.7 
IIASAIEC 1.4 2.0 3.2 4.5 6.0 
percentage of Region 111 57 54 5 3 5 2 5 1 
Low Scenario 
Region 111 2.4 3.3 4.5 5.6 6.7 
IIASAIEC 1.4 1.8 2.4 2.9 3.5 
percentage of Region 111 57 55 5 3 5 3 5 2 
TABLE 3.2 GDP per capita for IIASAIEC and IIASA Region 111, 1975-2030. 
GDP per capita (thousand US(1975) dollars) 
1975 1985 2000 2015 2030 
High Scenario 
Region I11 
IIASAIEC 
Low Scenario 
Region 111 
IIASAIEC 
TABLE 3.3 Average annual GDP growth rates for IIASAIEC and Region 111. 
Annual GDP growth rate (per cent per year) 
1975 - 1985 1985--2000 2000-201 5 2015--2030 
High Scenario 
Region I11 4.30 3.40 2.50 2.00 
IIASAIEC 3.84 3.16 2.40 1.95 
Low Scenario 
Region 111 3.17 2.10 1.50 1.20 
IIASAIEC 2.82 1.91 1.41 1.16 
The first category includesmining(excludingcoal, oil, and gas), basic metal industries, 
nonmetallic mineral products, chemicals (excluding petroleum and coal products), and 
the paper and pulp industry. It is characterized by a high energy demand per unit output, 
for both electricity and thermal uses. The thermal energy demand of the basic metal and 
building material industries is mostly in the high temperature range (furnace), while the 
chemical and paper industries have a high demand for steam. The other two industry 
categories have relatively modest energy intensities: the machinery and equipment sector's 
thermal energy demand is in the medium-to-high temperature range (metal treatment), 
while the nondurable goods industries have a high demand for steam and hot water. In 
the latter two categories, space heating is also important. 
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Table 3.4 shows the growth rates of the various sectors assumed for Region I11 and 
for the EC in the High and Low Scenarios. A common feature is a significantly below 
average growth rate for agriculture, an above average growth rate in the service sector, and 
a slightly below average growth rate for industry. Within industry, basic materials and 
nondurables are expected to have below average growth rates, and the machinery and 
equipment sector to grow at the same rate as the GDP. 
TABLE 3.4 Growth rates in value-added assumed for the EC and for Region 111 
(per cent per year, 1975-2030). 
Sector 
EC 
IIASAlEC IIASAlEC Region 'I1 
High Low High Low 
Agriculture 1.7 
Construction 1.7 
Industry (excluding energy) 
Basic materials 2.5 
Machinery and equipment 2.7 
Nondurables 2.6 
Energy 3.0 
Services 2.9 
Total GDP 2.7 
The structural changes implied by these growth rates, in addition to efficiency im- 
provements and fuel mix changes, contribute to the fall in the average energy intensity of 
manufacturing industries, as detailed in Tables 3.5 and 3.6. The annual rate of reduction 
of energy intensity (i.e. kilowatt-hours per US (1975) dollar GDP) is 0.9% for Region I11 
and 1.5% for the EC in the period 1975-1985, but is expected to decrease to values of 
0.4% (Low Scenario) or 0.6-0.7% (High Scenario). We adopted a higher value in the High 
Scenario, assuming a quicker renewal of capital stock under these conditions than in a 
low growth environment. The higher rate for the EC reflects the fact that there should be 
more scope - or rather a greater necessity - for reducing energy consumption in these 
countries than in Japan with its modern industry. 
The reduction of industrial energy intensity is shown in Table 3.6. This technological 
assumption might appear modest when compared with the 2.2% annual reduction achieved 
by the EC during the period 1960-1976, even more so the 2.7% per year in the USA and 
TABLE 3.5 Average energy intensity of  manufacturing industries in the EC and in JIASA Region 111, 
Average energy intensity of  manufacturing industry 
(watt-years per US(1975) dollar GDP) 
1975 1985 2000 2015 2030 
Region 111 0.9 1 0.83 (0.75-0.74) (0.70-067) (0.66-0.61) 
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TABLE 3.6 Average annual rate of reduction in energy intensity of manufacturing industries in the 
EC and in IIASA Region 111, 1975-2030. 
Average annual rate of reduction in energy intensity (per cent per year) 
1975-1985 1985-2000 2000-2015 2015-2030 
Region I11 0.92 (0.67-0.76) (0.46-0.66) (0.39-0.62) 
IIASAIEC (1.47-1.50) (0.81-0.91) (0.63-0.75) (0.39-0.73) 
Japan. On the other hand, high growth rates, together with the shift from a coal-based 
energy system to one relying mostly on oil and gas, certainly played a major part in the 
rapid reduction, and similar opportunities are not to be expected in the future. 
Table 3.7 summarizes the assumptions in the scenarios concerning freight transport- 
ation. Total activity is linked to GDP excluding services, i.e. the GDP contributions of the 
goods-producing sectors. Electricity consumption is converted to its primary energy equiv- 
alent for purposes of comparison. In the Region I11 scenarios, both the fuel mix and the 
energy intensities were kept constant because of the uncertainties in the base year values. 
In the IIASAIEC scenarios a significant shift to rail is introduced, leading to a decline in 
the average energy intensity, as shown in Table 3.7. Motor fuel consumption for interna- 
tional transportation and for military use is assumed to grow in proportion to GDP. 
Freight transportation accounts at present for about 24% of the total energy demand for 
transportation in the EC; this share increases to 3 1-34% in the scenarios. The share of 
TABLE 3.7 Freight transportation: summary characteristics. 
- 
IIASAIEC Region I11 
2030 2030 
1975 High Low 1975 High Low 
Activity ( lo9 ton-kilometers) 0.63 2.51 1.51 1.52 6.02 3.67 
GDP excluding services (thousand 
billion dollars) 0.62 2.49 1.50 1.23 4.91 3.00 
Unit cost (ton-kilometers per US(1975) 
dollar) 1.00 1.00 1 00 1.20 1.20 1.20 
Energy intensity (kilowatt-hours per 
ton-kilometer)'J 0.59 0.52 0.52 0.61 0.60 0.60 
Energy consumption (gigawatt-year@ 
per year)'J 42.6 148.6 88.8 105.0 415.2 253.0 
Share of total transportation energy 
(per cent) 24 34 31 32 35 34 
Energy consumption including inter- 
national transportation and 
military use (gigawatt-yearsb per 
year)'J 51.6 188.5 111.9 127.2 523.8 314.8 
Share of total transportation 
energy (per cent) 30 44 39 39 44 42 
aElectricity consumption converted to primary energy equivalent. 
b l  gigawatt = lo9 watts. 
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energy required for international transportation and military use increases from 6% in 
1975 to 8-10% by 2030. In Region I11 the initial share is higher than 6% because of the 
lower level of car ownership outside the EC, but it increases more slowly to a figure similar 
to that for the EC in 2030. 
Passenger transportation is not formally linked to an economic indicator in MEDEE- 
2, although a correlation between travel intensity and GDP per capita certainly exists. For 
IIASAIEC, it is assumed that the travel intensity will increase from 9600 kilometers per 
person per year to 17,000-20,000 km per person per year by 2030; the corresponding 
assumption for Region I11 was an increase from 9200 to 14,000-18,000 km per person 
per year. In the EC, car ownership increases from 270 to 400-500 per thousand persons 
by 2030, and in Region I11 from 190 to 3 1 0 4 5 0  by 2030. Whereas for cars a saturation 
of ownership and accordingly of total distance traveled can already be foreseen, air travel 
is only now becoming more widespread. Its share of total passenger-kilometers is assumed 
to increase to 6-1276, 
A major increase ( 3 0 4 0 % )  in the fuel efficiency of cars is assumed for both IIASAI 
EC and Region 111; in Region 111, the shift to more energy-intensive modes (car and plane) 
offsets these improvements, while in the EC, with its present high share of car transporta- 
tion, mass transit modes (train and bus) are assumed to increase their shares, contributing 
to a further reduction in the average energy intensity of passenger travel. The characteristics 
are summarized in Table 3.8. 
The household/se~ice sector energy demand in industrialized countries is dominated 
by space heating. The large increase in space heating in the past was mainly due to the 
trend to central heating of the total residential floor area rather than just the living room. 
At present about 50% of dwellings in the EC and about 30% of dwellings in Region I11 as 
a whole are centrally heated. By 2030, the figure for the EC is assumed to be 100% in the 
High Scenario. The continued trend to central heating partly offsets the reductions in 
space heating demand that can be expected as a result of better insulation. Air conditioning 
is disregarded as a major consumer of energy in all EC scenarios. Electricity demand for 
household appliances is expected to increase, however, from 1500 kilowatt-hours per 
TABLE 3.8 Passenger transportation: summary characteristics. 
IIASAIEC Region 111 
2030 2030 
1975 High Low 1975 High Low 
Activity ( l o 9  passenger-kilometers) 2.98 5.97 5.06 
TraveI intensity (thousand kilomcters 
per year) 9.6 19.7 16.6 
Proportion by car (per cent) 8 2 65 64  
Proportion by plane (per cent) 1 12 6 
Energy intensity (kilowatt-hours per 
passenger-ki1ometer)a 0.43 0.36 0.31 
Sectoral energy consumption 
(gigawatt-yearsb per year)" 122.6 242.4 177.7 
Share of  transportation energy (per cent) 70 56 6 1 
aElectricity consumption converted to primary energy equivalent. 
b1 gigawatt = l o 9  watts. 
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dwelling per year to  4500-6000 per dwelling per year in the EC. The present figure given 
for Region I11 for this demand appears overestimated; on the other hand, the electricity 
consumption of the service sector was underestimated (see Tables 3.9 and 3.10). 
The results of the MEDEE calculations with the sectoral and technological changes 
described are given in Figures 3.7 and 3.8. Figure 3.7 shows the sectoral shares in con- 
sumption and the shares in supply of various energy forms in the High Scenario for the 
EC and for Region 111. In both cases the share of the household/service sector decreases as 
a result of relatively low population growth, saturation tendencies in some demand cate- 
gories, and better system performance. Whereas for Region I11 this reduced share is offset 
by the increasing share of the transportation sector, this sector's share remains constant 
for the EC, and the industry share increases instead. Although electricity is assumed to 
penetrate only moderately into thermal uses in these scenarios, the electricity share in- 
creases by about 60% in Region 111 and by about 80% in the EC. Demand for rnotor fuel 
TABLE 3.9 Households: summary characteristics. 
IIASAlEC Region 111 
2030 2030 
1975 Hinh Low 1975 High Low 
Persons per dwelling 2.98 2.30 3 .OO 2.56 
Number of dwellings (millions) 86 132 187 300 
Useful energy per dwe lhg  (thousand 
kilowatt-hours per year) 18.3 24.5 21.6 12.7 20.6 17.5 
Space and water heating (per cent) 88 72 75 75 6 2 65 
Cooking (per cent) 4 3 4 10 6 7 
Air conditioning (per cent) - 0 0 -. 3 2 
Electrical appliances (per cent) 8 25 21 l5a 29 26 
Total sectoral useful energy (gigawatt- 
years per year) 180 369 325 272a 705 600 
aElectricity use for electrical appliances was considerably overestimated in the base year (1975) for 
Region Ill; electricity use in the service sector was underestimated. 
TABLE 3.10 Service sector: summary characteristics. 
IIASAlEC Region I11 
2030 2030 
1975 High Low 1975 High Low 
Floor area per worker (square meters) 29 42 38 28 35 32 
Total area ( l o9  square meters) 1.75 3.41 3.00 3.00 7.26 6.00 
Useful energy per square meter 
(thousand kilowatt-hours per 
square meter per year) 0.28 0.26 0.23 0.15 0.21 0.19 
Specific electricity (per cent) 25 37 33 26a 50 47 
Air conditioning (per cent) 1 9 7 2 4 3 
Thermal uses (per cent) 74 5 4 60 72 46 5 0 
Total sectoral useful energy 
(gigawatt-years per year) 57 101 81 52a 172 130 
aElectricity use for electrical appliances was considerably overestimated in the base year (1975) for 
Region 111; electricity use in the service sector was underestimated. 
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and feedstocks also increases considerably, while the share of fossil fuels for thermal uses 
declines from 60% to 40% in the EC and from 55% to  35% in Region 111. It was assumed 
that coal use would increase in industry, but that its inconvenience would further diminish 
its share in the household/service sector. The main substitute for oil for thermal uses is 
expected to be gas (see Figure 3.8). 
Although the energy demand assessment was made on the basis of specific sectoral 
and technological assumptions, the uncertainty in many details necessitates a feasibility 
check on an aggregate level. Table 3.1 1 and Figure 3.9 present some aggregate indicators 
of the evolution outlined in these scenarios. In the High Scenario, final energy consump- 
tion per capita increases by 80% in the EC and doubles in Region 111 between 1975 and 
2030; in the Low Scenario, only a moderate increase, by 29% or 37% respectively, occurs. 
On the other hand, the final-energy-to-GDP ratio in the Low Scenario is reduced by about 
50%; notwithstanding the strong increase in the share of electricity, this evolution implies 
a significant reduction in relative energy demand in comparison with past trends, as shown 
in Figure 3.9. 
TABLE 3.11 Summary of final energy demand projections for IIASA/EC and IIASA Region 111, 
1975-2030 (the f i s t  value is for the High Scenario, the second for the Low Scenario). 
Final energy (terawatt- 
years per year) 
Region 111 1.59 1.96-2.20 2.39-3.03 2.74-3.77 2.99-4.37 
IIASA/EC 0.91 1.05-1.13 1.17-1.43 1.27-1.70 1.38-1.93 
(Percentage of 
Region 111) 5 7 53-52 49-47 46-45 46-44 
Electricity share (per- 
cen tage o f  final energy) 
Region 111 13 14 17 19 21 
IIASA/EC 11 14 17 19 20 
Final energy per capita 
(kilowatts per capita) 
Region I11 2.84 3.21-3.59 3.52-4.46 3.77-5 18 3.90-5 70 
IIASA/EC 3.53 3.90-4.20 4.09%5.02 4.31-5 78 4.54-6.35 
Final-energy-to-GDP ratio 
(watt-years per US 
( 1  9 75) dollar) 
Region I11 0.67 0.60-0.60 0.54-0.5 1 0.49-0.43 0.45-0.37 
IIASA/EC 0.67 0.59-0.57 0.49-0.45 0.43-0.38 0.40-~0.32 
1975-1985 1985-2000 2000-2015 2015-2030 
Final-energy-to-GDP 
elasticity 
Region 111 0.68-0.77 0.64-0.65 0.60--0.59 0.49-0.50 
IIASA/EC 0.50-0.57 0.38-0.51 0.41-0.49 0.47--0.43 
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FIGURE 3.9 Evolution of GDPper capitaand primary energy intensity per unit GDP (High Scenarios). 
3.1.2 The Evolution of Supply 
The disaggregation of the energy supply system of IIASA's Region I11 into "EC" 
and "Other Region 111" has to  retain the general characteristics of the energy supply situa- 
tion of Region 111. In a nutshell, this means that the import dependence of the EC stays 
high in spite of optimistic assumptions about the indigenous production of primary energy. 
Owing to the extended availability of "dirty" fossil fuels at the global level, the "fossil 
era" will extend beyond the year 2030. The disaggregation of IIASA's Region I11 in terms 
of input data for MESSAGE, together with the input data for the IIASAIEC High and 
Low Scenarios, is described in the Appendix. 
Before the IIASAIEC supply scenarios are specified here in more detail, two points 
concerning the scenario results for Region I11 and affecting the solution of the MESSAGE 
model for the EC subregion will be discussed. The first point is that the projections of 
indigenous oil supply in Region 111 were based on early and optimistic assumptions. This 
means that indigenous oil production figures for the period immediately following the 
reference year 1975 are too high, and import requirements now calculated are consequently 
too low for the early time periods of the IIASAIEC scenarios. The second point is that no 
interregional trade in natural uranium was contemplated in the IIASA scenarios. Rather, a 
so-called "area approach" was adopted. In this approach, the potential uranium reserves 
of each region in proportion to  the total land area of each of the seven IIASA regions 
were determined. The specific uranium content per unit area was calibrated against Region 
I (North America), which is the best explored of the IIASA world regions. This uranium 
estimation method yields for the EC a total of 770,000 tons of uranium available at a 
cost of up to US(1975)$50 per pound. Since this amount falls short of the actual EC 
demand, the most obvious adjustment would have been to assume intraregional trade of 
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natural uranium between the EC and the "rest of the region". In view of the uncertain 
future of global uranium markets, two extreme cases have been considered: (1) adequate 
indigenous reserves of uranium to meet any requirements in MESSAGE; and (2) no indige- 
nous supply of uranium whatsoever. Accordingly, in this section two numbers are given in 
each case for the dependence of the EC on energy imports. The f i s t  is the import depen- 
dence assuming totally indigenous supply of natural uranium; the second (in parentheses) 
is the import dependence under the assumption that all the uranium used in the model is 
imported. 
The dependence on imports as well as the description c f  the IIASAIEC scenarios in 
terms of the tentative policy goals as described in Crucial Choices for the Energy Transi- 
tion (Commission of the European Communities 1980) are contained in Table 3.12. Case 
IIa (the Acceptable Dependence Case) of Crucial Choices is shown for comparison. 
TABLE 3.12 Compliance of scenarios with tentative policy goals. 
IIASA/lC IIASA/EC Acceptable 
High Low Dependence Case 
Primary energy in 2030 (per cent) 
Coal 28 15 2 1 
Oil 15 29 29 
Gas 16 15 1 3  
Nuclear 3 7 36 28 
Renewables 5 6 10  
Import dependence (per centla 
2000 36(52) 37(48) 66 
2030 32(40) 39(43) 45 
aThe first figure shows the import dependence assuming totally indigenous supply 
of natural uranium; the second (in parentheses) is the import dependence under the 
assumption that all the uranium used in the model is imported. 
Year 
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FIGURE 3.10 Primary energy supply, IIASA/EC Low Scenario. FBR, fast breeder reactor; LWR, light 
water reactor. 
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With the exception of the nuclear share in total primary energy, the IIASA/EC 
scenarios meet the tentative policy goals: firstly, an import dependence in the year 2030 
of less than 50%; secondly, a dependence of no more than 30% on any single fuel. The 
absolute quantities behind these relative figures are shown in Figures 3.1 0-3.1 2, the 
primary energy supply. The total primary energy supply of the Acceptable Dependence 
Case of Crucial Choices falls about halfway between the IIASA/EC High and Low Scenarios. 
However, this statement only applies for the end of the model study period. In the early 
time periods the primary energy requirements in the EC Case IIa grow even faster than 
those in the IIASA/EC High Scenario, which in turn outgrow the Case IIa primary energy 
supply around the year 2010. The reason for this change is the rather drastic decline in 
economic growth in Case IIa after the year 2000 necessitated by the policy constraints 
described in Crucial Choices. In contrast, the IIASA/EC scenarios exhibit steadier growth 
at the expense of violating the policy constraints. The differences between the scenarios 
with regard to the contribution of each fuel type are explained in the following. 
Oil 
Owing to  optimistic estimates of the potential for the fast development of oil pro- 
duction within Region 111, the allocations for indigenous oil supply in the IIASAIEC 
scenarios are rather high. The import quantities are accordingly lower (Figures 3.1 3-3.1 5). 
Toward the fifty-year time horizon, the strain on indigenous oil production will be signif- 
icantly higher in the High than in the Low Scenario (i.e. oil in cost category I1 (see Appen- 
dix) is only marginally extracted in the Low Scenario). Furthermore, the cumulative 
availability of oil imports in the IIASA/EC scenarios is higher in the Low Scenario, since 
the reduced energy demand of other world regions will considerably cut back oil imports 
there. In contrast to the IIASA/EC allocations, the EC scenarios have corrected downward 
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FIGURE 3.13 Liquid fuel supply, IIASAIEC Low Scenario. (See Appendix for oil cost categories.) 
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Synthetic Liquid Fuels 
In none of the scenarios considered here can the demand for liquid fuels be met by 
crude oil products alone. Coal liquefaction technology was therefore included in the sup- 
ply scenarios. The technical process was not specified in detail; the key assumption was 
that of an autothermal process (i.e. a technique in which all energy inputs are in the form 
of coal; this is in contrast to an allothermal technique, which uses process heat from other 
sources for the synthesis) with a conversion efficiency of 60%, at a cost slightly higher 
than US(1975)$20 per barrel of crude oil equivalent, and that will be available froin the 
year 2000 onward. In the IIASA/EC scenarios these costs make synthetic liquids slightly 
more expensive than those derived from imported crude oil. In the IIASA/EC High Sce- 
nario synthetic liquids amount to an equivalent of 300 million tons of oil (Mtoe) in the 
year 2030, thus contributing 47% to the supply of liquid fuels. For the other two scenar- 
ios (IIASA/EC Low and the Acceptable Dependence Case) the corresponding numbers are 
73 (53) Mtoe, corresponding to 11 (12)% of total liquid fuel demand. 
Natural Gas 
The common feature of the scenarios considered in this section is that gas imports 
into the EC are rising quite sharply, even in the IIASA/EC Low Scenario (see Figures 
3.16-3.18). In the global IIASA runs, these imports come from the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe. As in the case of oil, the greater availability of natural gas imports in the 
Low Scenarios is made use of to relax the strain on indigenous production requirements. 
In Case IIa, the high temperature reactor (HTR) supplies large quantities of gaseous fuels 
(producing only marginal amounts of electricity as a byproduct). In the IIASA/EC scenar- 
ios the HTR is not considered explicitly because in these the label FBR (fast breeder reac- 
tor) is intended to include all advanced reactors, which is to be interpreted as reactors 
Year 
FIGURE 3.16 Gas supply, IIASA/EC Low Scenario. (See Appendix for gas cost categories.) 
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that make much more efficient use of enriched uranium. Although these advanced 
reactors quite quickly replace the conventional reactors (labeled LWR) consuming enriched 
uranium, the consumption of enriched uranium nearly exhausts the EC's estimated 
ultimately recoverable uranium resources in the IIASAIEC scenarios. This emphasizes the 
importance of the thorium cycle in advanced reactors. 
FIGURE 3.17 Gas supply, IIASAIEC High Scenario. 
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FIGURE 3.18 Gas supply, Crucial Choices Case Ila. HTR, high temperature reactor. 
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Coal 
The significant feature in the curves for coal use (Figures 3.19-3.21) is the double 
peak that occurs in all the scenarios shown. This double peak reflects the two different 
uses of coal in the scenarios. Initially more coal is needed for electricity generation, but 
also, in the long term, coal serves as the carbon input in producing synthetic fuels. A de- 
cline and subsequent new rise in coal production and consumption may be economically 
and technically undesirable. This suggests the investigation of an EC Coal Scenario (see 
Section 4) which would be characterized by steadier growth in coal consumption together 
with slower growth in nuclear energy supply. 
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FIGURE 3.21 Uses o f  coal, EC Crucial Choices Case IIa. HTR, high temperature reactor. 
Renewable Energy Sources 
The contributions of renewable energy sources (other than hydropower and geo- 
thermal energy, which are considered separately) in the IIASA/EC scenarios in the year 
2030 are 5% (High Scenario) and 6% (Low Scenario). These percentages are in striking 
contrast with Case IIa, in which the corresponding figure is 10%. The high 10% contribu- 
tion from renewable soft energy forms had been normatively introduced in Crucial Choices, 
in disregard of prohibitive cost estimates. 
3.2 Discrepancies between the GIobal and the EC Perspectives 
The five scenarios presented in Crucial Choices were derived on the basis of the 
methodology shown in Figure 2.3, which is itself a modification of Figure 2.1. The driving 
inputs to the model loop, as in the global IIASA scenarios, were the assumed growth rates 
of population and economic activity. Unlike in the IIASA study, the decision crjteria 
in Gucial Choices for accepting or rejecting a scenario were based on "energy import 
dependence" and "technological preferences". In order to cross-check the impact of each 
energy supply strategy on the economic environment in the EC scenarios implied by the 
demand calculations, the macroeconomic growth model MACRO was used. This model 
monitors changes in macroeconomic parameters such as investment rates, capital-output 
ratios, labor inputs, or energy-GDP elasticities in accordance with historically observed 
evolutions and/or given (or anticipated) normative changes. The MACRO version imple- 
mented for the Crucial Choices analysis contained two distinct blocks: a production 
module of the neoclassical type with capital and labor as the factors of production, and a 
quasi-Keynesian final demand block determining the aggregate levels of private consump- 
tion, gross fixed capital formation, exports, and imports. The adaptation of MACRO to 
the job of cross-checking energy strategies was achieved by introducing into this model 
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energy import requirements, energy import prices, and specific capital requirements of 
the energy production sector. Straightforwardly applying such a growth model to monitor 
the effect on the economy of a changing energy sector - as was done for the Crucial 
Choices scenarios - has certain disadvantages: this method cannot trace indirect feedback 
effects of rising energy prices an overall economic development; nor can the consistency 
between energy supply and energy demand levels at given energy prices be investigated. 
Furthering the strong energy conservation effects and the resulting low elasticities, detailed 
in Figure 8 of Crucial Choices, suggested just such feedbacks and inconsistencies in price 
effects. The shortcomings of the original MACRO model prompted the development of 
an improved version of MACRO, described in Rogner (1982). 
In the new MACRO version, energy is introduced as a factor of production in the 
aggregate production function. The macroeconomic demand and supply of all three pro- 
duction factors - capital, labor, and energy - is balanced by way of their respective market 
prices, in accordance with the underlying production function. 
Applying the new MACRO model to the Crucial Choices scenarios revealed, in the 
case of the Acceptable Dependence Case (Case IIa), some serious inconsistencies, which are 
illustrated in Figure 3.22. On the basis of the energy demand evolution in the Acceptable 
Dependence Case (bottom curve) the equilibrium energy price should have followed the 
top broken curve. Instead, the price development actually according to  MESSAGE is 
indicated by the lower broken curve. These discrepancies can be interpreted in the follow- 
ing way: the overall energy conservation effects assumed in MEDEE are not consistent 
with the price level of energy on the supply side calculated by MESSAGE. This price level 
would correspond to the expansion in energy demand indicated by the upper solid curve 
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in Figure 3.22. Starting from a level of energy demand and energy prices calculated in the 
Oucial Choices scenarios, the new MACRO model produced notable deviations in the 
evolution of the gross domestic product. More abundant and cheaper energy, of course, 
allowed for higher economic growth rates than a lesser and costlier energy supply (every- 
thing else kept constant). Figure 3.23 illustrates the differences in the expansion of GDP 
for the two consistent cases shown in Figure 3.22. 
The inconsistencies revealed by the MACRO test between energy price evolutions 
and GDP or energy consumption evolutions basically reflect an inconsistency in the two 
sets of variables governing the projections of MEDEE and MESSAGE. The projected be- 
havior of energy consumers utilizing energy to produce and consume GDP (i.e. what 
MEDEE simulates with the help of technological projections) does not match economically 
with the conditions under which this set of consumers can be supplied with energy 
(i.e. the macroeconomically optimal allocation of resources and supply technologies in 
MESSAGE). Quantitatively this inconsistency cannot be resolved by ruling out the Crucial 
Choices scenarios and preferring instead one or both of the IIASAIEC scenarios described 
in section 3.1. In order to see this, one might compare the GDP evolutions of the Accept- 
able Dependence Case (Case IIa) with those of the IIASAIEC High Scenario. The latter 
yields substantially lower GDP evolutions than the former. In line with the findings shown 
in Figures 3.22 and 3.23, however, a reduction of GDP in the Acceptable Dependence 
Case would only result from substantially higher energy costs. In Figure 3.1 1, the primary 
energy supply system of the IIASAIEC High Scenario, substantially more energy is allocated 
to the EC economy than in Figure 3.12, the Acceptable Dependence Case energy system. 
At least for the period up to  2010, though, the average energy cost level does not differ 
substantially between Figures 3.1 1 and 3.12 owing to  the similar supply pattern of the 
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alternative sources. Thus, within the MACRO logic, the GDP evolution of the IIASAIEC 
High Scenario comes closer to being consistent with the energy demandevolution. Although 
the energy price still seems far too low, macroeconomically speaking, one can conclude 
that there is not enough incentive to bring about the projected level of energy conserva- 
tion implied by the Crucial Choices and the IIASAIEC Scenarios. In fact, the energy cost/ 
energy utility inconsistencies outlined lead to the central question of the extent to which 
the energy problem will impede an otherwise feasible economic evolution. This prompts 
the corollary question of whether the energy sector should not be isolated from the rest of 
the economy and stabilized through transfer payments. After all, the technoeconomic 
scenarios of Crucial Choices, as well as the IIASAIEC scenarios, are constrained by the 
volume of energy imports available. At the same time, the exogenously futed oil reference 
price limits exploitation of alternative more expensive indigenous energy sources. Under 
the "free market" principle for energy, a macroeconomically justified higher energy 
demand sustaining effective use of capital and labor would lead to higher imports; these 
are, however, unavailable. Consequently, the scenarios have normatively fixed high 
conservation rates and, additionally, cutbacks on economic growth. The results of the 
macroeconomic consistency test in section 3.2 illustrate that energy conservation rates 
are not justified at the rates of increase in labor productivity that are still considered 
feasible; basically one could say that conservation and factors supporting GDP growth do 
not match. Under such circumstances, one would certainly consider financing both 
energy conservation and indigenous energy supplies by means of transfer payments from 
the economy, by reinvesting part of the GDP increases realized, thereby supporting the 
additional energy supply potential required to bring about this GDP increment. Whether 
such strategies would be appropriate largely depends on the prospects for further labor 
productivity improvements. In order to explore such a possibility, the use of macroeco- 
nomically adapted energy scenarios is indicated. These scenarios primarily have to assess 
the macroeconomic growth potential, recognizing first the scarcity of labor and capital. 
The demand for energy and its macroeconomic substitution price result from the productive 
condition of the economy and can be estimated endogenously. It is obvious that a highly 
productive economy, because of its growth tendencies, would absorb increasing amounts 
of energy even at increasing prices. The endogenous evaluation of energy can, but need 
not necessarily, coincide with the technoeconomic possibilities of adding energy increments 
on the supply side. It is also obvious that this evaluation and the process of clearing 
international energy markets would rank energy differently. A modified, restructured itera- 
tive approach to the scenario design appeared necessary in the light of these considerations. 
4 THE ADAPTED SCENARIO SET FOR THE EC 
The economic inconsistencies that emerged between the global and the indigenous 
technical solutions (quantified in the IIASAIEC scenarios and in the EC scenarios of 
Crucial Choices respectively) suggested a modification of the scenario writing procedure. 
The envisaged modification reversed the principal line of thought. Previously the analysis 
started with the specification (in the form of assumptions) of numerous parameters con- 
cerning efficiencies, lifestyles, and shifts between economic sectors within the energy 
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demand model MEDEE. In the subsequent energy supply model MESSAGE, similar speci- 
fications relating to energy conversion technologies had to be made. The MACRO model 
finally made use of the aggregate of the assumptions in the form of the MEDEE and 
MESSAGE output, including discrepancies of the kind discussed in section 3.2. In section 
4.1 the new approach is presented. This time the analysis starts with MACRO projecting 
overall economic expansion by consistently clearing markets for capital, labor, and energy. 
Labor productivity evolution and labor force participation rates serve as initial inputs in 
this new scenario writing procedure, which results in an Economic Response Scenario (see 
section 4.2). MEDEE translates the aggregate expansion of GDP and equilibrium secondary 
energy demand into sectoral economic activities and final forms of energy (section 4.3), 
thus arriving at the required efficiency improvements, lifestyles, etc. These parameters 
then represent an output rather than an input specification. Finally (section 4.4) MESSAGE 
investigates this Economic Response Scenario with special consideration of the contribu- 
tions of nuclear energy and coal to the energy supply system of the EC. 
4.1 The Economic Productivity Approach versus the Energy Demand Approach 
The uncertainty of predicted changes in lifestyles and efficiencies and the difficul- 
tiesin initiatingsuch changesin a market economy have been major handicaps in long-term 
scenario writing. The new version of MACRO - together with some modifications in the 
sequence of the models - is a step in the direction of disaggregating the uncertainty of 
such changes and their consequences. This is not to say that this new design fully resolves 
the problem of ambiguity, but rather that it adds a new dimension to the analysis and 
thus limits the range of uncertainty. For example, it has not so far been indicated how 
and for what reasons energy conservation efforts will or should penetrate into energy con- 
sumption. If one assumes price-induced conservation, discrepancies detailed in section 3.2 
between the energy demand as calculated by MEDEE and the energy price level given by 
MESSAGE may occur. With the newly arranged set of models, this kind of inconsistency 
can essentially be avoided. Furthermore, the new approach has the advantage of using 
MEDEE to interpret the aggregate equilibrium energy demand of MACRO so as to disag- 
gregate this energy demand into the corresponding structural changes in the main eco- 
nomic sectors and the implications for energy end use with regard to efficiencies, conserva- 
tion, etc. The methodological approach was modified according to Figure 4.1. 
- The set of energy models is headed by MACRO, thus replacing the former sce- 
nario assumptions on economic growth rates by internally calculated rates. In- 
stead, the assumed development of labor productivity has become the essential 
exogenously determined input. 
- Energy import quantities and prices were taken from the global lIASA scenar- 
ios, as derived from the identification of the EC region within Region 111. 
- MACRO'S output was monitored against the GDP as given by the IIASAIEC 
Low Scenario. Productivity assumptions in MACRO were modified until the 
internally generated GDPgrowth rates matched those of this Economic Response 
Scenario. 
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MEDEE takes the aggregate expansion of GDP and secondary energy demand, 
estimating the structural evolution of the main economic sectors and the corre- 
sponding efficiency improvements and conservation efforts, as well as the final 
energy demand (quantities and forms of energy). 
MESSAGE calculates the energy supply and conversion activities consistent 
with the final energy demand of MEDEE and the energy price ceiling provided 
by MACRO. The possible market penetration of domestic energy supplies to- 
gether with the reduction of energy imports was the focus of this part of the 
analysis. 
The loop was closed by feeding energy, capital requirements, and the actual 
import needs for an energy supply strategy back into MACRO. Thus the flexi- 
bility gained by introducing higher prices for the domestic energy supply (in 
order to increase domestic investment) and alternatively the drain of resources 
through increased energy imports could be analyzed. 
4.2 Macroeconomic Perspectives 
In the previous section the revised arrangement of the set of energy models was 
introduced. The loop in thlsconfiguration begins with MACRO, representing an inner loop 
in its own right. That is to say that before the remaining models MEDEE and MESSAGE 
were included consecutively in the loop, iterations between MACRO and the main driving 
inputs or control variables became necessary in order to define a new Reference Case. As 
already explained in the general outline, the control variable chosen as the most essential 
in this ongoing analysis was labor productivity. Consequently, new projections of this 
exogenously determined variable had to be made. In cooperation with the Directorate 
General XI1 of the EC Commission,outlooks on the future evolution of labor productivity 
were identified. Figure 4.2 shows the essential variations of labor productivity compared 
with Case IIa of Chtcial Choices. In addition to labor productivity, some of the socio- 
demographic variables were revised at the same time. The labor force participation rate 
was assumed to drop to 30% by the year 2030 compared with 35% in Case IIa. Such a 
reduction in the potential supply of labor reflects the change in the overall age structure 
of the EC region due to declining population growth rates as well as the effects of antici- 
pated improvements in the welfare system, such as earlier rights to retirement pension, or 
the tendency to a shorter working week that has been observed during the past decade. 
All the other exogenously determined variables necessary to run MACRO were transcribed 
directly from Case IIa, including the remaining discrepancies between energy demand and 
equilibrium energy prices explained in section 3.2. Two basically controversial develop- 
ments had therefore to  be smoothed out. It must be assumed either that the physical 
quantity of energy supplied or that the energy price structure in the original analysis for 
Case IIa is appropriate. In order to evaluate these two paths and eventually to arrive at a 
synthesis, the following subcases were performed: 
(1) The aggregate energy supply was assumed to be identical to that of Case IIa 
and the corresponding new equilibrium price was calculated. 
(2) The equilibrium energy price of Case IIa (see top broken curve in Figure 3.23) 
was taken and the consistent aggregate energy demand was derived. 
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FIGURE 4.2 The change in productivity and labor supply (man-hours per year) assumed in the energy 
models, in comparison with those for Case IIa. 
These two subcases can be summarized as follows: each case was confronted with declin- 
ing labor productivity growth rates and a drop in the labor participation rate, thus reduc- 
ing the potential labor input (a quasi-index of productivity multiplied by the potential 
labor force and the average number of hours worked per week) to roughly 50% of that of 
Case IIa. A substantial slowdown of economic activity had a prion to be expected. In case 
1 the burden of the retarded productivity growth is mitigated to some extent by the avail- 
ability of sufficient energy at prices that hardly differ from today's in real terms. This is 
easily understood on considering various indicators in Tables 4 . 1 4 . 3 .  For example, the 
energy intensity remains on a very high level throughout the planning period. The avail- 
ability of sufficient energy at quasi-constant real prices slows down any substitution pro- 
cess between energy and other factors of production. Thus energy conservation is not a 
real issue in this case. Economic growth rates, as expected, range considerably lower than 
in Case IIa, owing to  not only the low growth in productivity but also the negative trade 
balance. Domestic energy production appears to be less expensive than imported energy. 
However, market penetration constraints restrict the rate of expansion of domestic energy 
production plants. Therefore 45%of total primary energy stillhas to be imported by 2030. 
In case 2 the higher energy costs have a twofold effect: (1) secondary energy use is 
cut by roughly 27% compared with Case IIa and (2) the level of GDP is reduced even be- 
low that of case 1 (see Table 4.1). The capital-output ratio ranges 5% above the value for 
case 1 (3.97). This seems to be not too significant, but the picture is somewhat distorted 
since the major impact on the economy is the reduction in economic activity. If one tries 
to arrive at a quasi-isoquant (the same economic output as in case I), the substitution of 
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TABLE 4.1 GDPgrowth rates in Case IIa and subcases 1 and 2. 
GDP growth rate (per cent per year) 
Case IIa 4.0 2.5 1.7 
Subcase 1 2.2 1.3 1.2 
Subcase 2 2.0 1.1 0.9 
TABLE 4.2 Relative energy intensity in Case IIa and sub- 
cases 1 and 2. 
Relative energy intensity (1970 = 100) 
Case IIa 81.5 63.7 53.0 49.5 
Subcasel 88.5 84.5 82.6 75.2 
Subcase 2 80.4 70.2 67.2 63.0 
TABLE 4.3 Secondary energy prices in subcases 1 and 2. 
Secondary energy prices 
(US(1975) dollars per ton of coal equivalent) 
1985 2000 2015 2030 
Subcase I 85.1 102.9 105.4 107.3 
Subcase 2 110.9 150.2 178.7 211.5 
capital for energy pushes the capital-output ratio to 4.25. The effect on labor is insig- 
nificant since labor supply is by definition very tight and limits any substitution possibilities. 
However, the absolute level of the real wage rate - or labor income - differs by 6% be- 
tween case 1 and case 2. At this point it becomes necessary to create a synthesis of cases 1 
and 2, which is done by taking the average of the energy price growth in cases 1 and 2 
(see Figure 4.3). Furthermore, it is normatively assumed that the energy import ceiling 
and the unit energy import price correspond to those in the IIASAIEC Low Scenario. It 
takes only a few iterations of the inner loop, using MACRO only and monitoring against 
the GDP of the IIASAlEC Low Scenario, to arrive at a converging solution for the Eco- 
nomic Response Scenario: that is to say, for economic activity to reach the same absolute 
value of GDP by the year 2030. Only the growth rates in each period follow a slightly dif- 
ferent pattern (see Table 4.4). 
The central point of this Economic Response Scenario is to analyze the trade-off 
between energy imports and investments in the domestic energy production sector, and 
the impacts on the structural evolution of the main economic sectors. Thus the output of 
MACRO initiates the iterations of the entire loop including MEDEE and MESSAGE, as 
shown in Figure 4.1. 
The MACRO model is next confronted with two future energy supply paths. One is 
characterized by very favorable capital costs for the nuclear energy production technologies 
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TABLE 4.4 Economic indicators in the Economic Response Scenario. 
CDP growth rates (per cent) 2.2 1.2 1.1 
Relative energy intensity (1970 - 100) = 83 = 74 = 70 
Secondary energy price (US(1975) 
dollars per ton of coal equivalent) 83-131 131-140 140-160 
(the Nuclear Case), while in the second nuclear energy is considered to fall more in the 
higher investment categories, thus favoring coal technologies (the Coal Case). The loop - 
and especially the MESSAGE model - allocates resources quite differently, but the 
impacts on overall economic development are not significant (see Table 4.5). In the 
Nuclear Case (favorable nuclear capital costs in MESSAGE) the energy import dependence 
is reduced to 28% (cf. 45%in Case IIa, 30% in the Economic Response Scenario), allowing 
the trade balance to remain stable and to range slightly positive. Energy import costs 
roughly double between 1980 and 2030, which is sufficient time for the economy to ad- 
just appropriately, especially since initial cutbacks in energy imports occur in the 1980s, 
from about 800 million tons of coal equivalent in 1978 to 625 million tce in 1985. 
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TABLE 4.5 GDP growth rates in the Economic Response Scenario with favorable 
and unfavorable nuclear capital costs. 
GDP growth rate (per cent per year) 
- - ~ - - ~  - - ~ -  - - - -  - - 
Favorable nuclcar capital costs (Nuclear 1.98 1.18 1.11 
Case) 
Unfavorable nuclear capital costs (Coal 
Case) 1.96 1.12 1.08 
When nuclear investment costs are assumed to fall into higher cost categories, the 
energy import dependence can only be reduced to about 3976, as shown in Figure 4.4(b). 
The higher energy import quantities, however, push the trade balance into the negative 
range (see Figure 4.4(a)). This becomes quite apparent around the turn of the century 
when breeder reactors are delayed owing to  cost considerations. The initial trade surplus 
in Figure 4.4 is due to minor inconsistencies between the MACRO model, based on his- 
torically estimated parameters and trends, and the MESSAGE model. 
What are the macroeconomic consequences of these two future energy paths? The 
development of the GDP evolves as expected along a middle-of-the-road path between 
the subcases 1 and 2 (see Tables 4.1 -4.4.) The cumulative difference in GDP amounts to 
US(1975)$1150 billion, about the amount of the GDP of the EC in 1970. Though small 
in relative terms considered over a period of fifty years, this difference represents an 
absolute amount that should not be neglected. The GDP loss may be put into perspective 
by considering two additional economic indicators: the cumulative loss in the trade 
balance and the cumulative requirements for capital formation within the energy sector. 
Over the next five decades US(1975)$930 billion of additional economic output or 
national income are transferred to the energy-producing countries in the unfavorable 
nuclear capital cost case. This figure contrasts with the cumulative amount of 
US(1975)$120 billion in additional investment required in the EC energy sector in the 
favorable nuclear capital cost case. To put it another way: the increased domestic energy 
production in the case based on lower specific investment costs for nuclear energy can be 
sustained with little greater capital accumulation in the energy sector than is required for 
the high import case with high specific nuclear investment costs. The capital intensity per 
ton of coal equivalent in production capacity is quite significant: $1360 per tce compared 
i 
with $1 105 per tce in the favorable nuclear capital cost scenarios (the figure for 1970 was I 
$720 per tce). In each scenario, the aggregate energy sector charges against the rest of the 
economy. Since the difference in the absolute amounts of investment needed in the 
domestic energy sector appears to be small (but still $1 20 billion, corresponding to seven 
times the total investment in energy in 1970)*, any impact on economic development in 
the unfavorable nuclear capital cost scenario must originate from the greater dependence 
on energy imports. 
*z:: INVE = $2140 billion in the favorable nuclear capital cost case, compared with $2020 billion 
in the high import case. 
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FIGURE 4.4 (a)The effect on the trade balance and @) the dependence on energy imports in the Coal 
Scenario and the Nuclear Scenario. 
The drain on economic resources over the next 50 years in the high import scenario 
amounts to  $930 billion, causing an accumulated loss in GDP of the order of $1 150 billion 
owing to  the increased capital intensiveness of domestic energy needs. The resulting nega- 
tive trade balance discourages private businesses from investing. The total investment rate 
drops by one percentage point, from 18.6% to 17.6%. Accumulated, this drop in the invest- 
ment rate corresponds to $945 billion in total investment, almost exactly the amount of 
income transferred to  the energy-producing countries. 
On aggregate, the favorable nuclear capital cost case implies a more capital-intensive 
economy (owing to  the accelerated build-up of an advanced nuclear infrastructure) than 
in the high nuclear capital cost scenario (the Coal Scenario). The output of the economic- 
resource- (capital-) consuming energy sector, however, is a high quality p~.oduct - energy - 
whose internal economic value has been increased through the permanently increasing 
prices of the only alternative (apart from conservation and efficiency improvements): im- 
ported energy. 
Macroeconomically, the model runs indicate that the two responses to  a tougher 
energy supply situation impede economic growth equally, given the assumed energy prices 
and investment costs. To a first order approximation, neglecting any multiplier and accel- 
erator effects of substituting for imports, it makes little difference whether the same 
amount of energy is provided via more costly indigenous investments or via increased 
imports and thus negative trade balances. The very minor deviations in the development 
of the GDP shown in Table 4.5 seem to  support this conclusion. 
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4.3 A Consistent Energy Demand Structure 
Following the approach outlined in section 4.1 and illustrated in Figure 4.1, the 
next step in this analysis requires the disaggregation of the GDP expansion calculated by 
MACRO into sectoral activities. The sectoral composition of GDP and its future evolution 
represent the economic structure and the structural change within an economy respectively. 
Structural change and the level of economic activity have to be interpreted as the essential 
driving forces for future energy demand. 
The output of MACRO available to MEDEE concerns the absolute level of aggregate 
demand GDP and its components, i.e. private consumption C,  gross fixed capital forma- 
tion INV, government expenditure for goods and services G, exports X, and imports M. 
Furthermore, the specific characteristics of the domestic energy sector provide additional 
information for use in MEDEE, such as value added, investment level, capital stock, and 
manpower requirements. Finally, according to  the modified methodological approach, 
MACRO'S aggregate equilibrium demand for secondary energy must now be translated 
into sectoral energy conservation efforts, efficiency improvements, etc., by specifying the 
corresponding final energy demand (forms and quantities). 
The Economic Response Scenario, as discussed in section 4.2, provides the quanti- 
tative input for the subsequent MEDEE analysis. The GDP grows at the rates shown in 
Table 4.4. For purposes of comparison, Tables 4.6 and 4.7 present the GDP growth rates 
of the Economic Response Scenario and the IIASAIEC High and Low Scenarios, together 
with the projections of other long-term studies. The relative shares of the components of 
GDP are given in Table 4.8 for the years 1975,2000, and 2030. The steady drop in GDP 
growth (to rates far below those observed in the 1950s and 1960s) causes a drop in the 
investment rate from a level ranging between 20.5% and 23% (1960-1975) t o  a level of 
17.4-1 8.6% by 2030. The replacement share of investments, however, shows a consider- 
ably higher value by the year 2030 of about 78% in the nonenergy sector, compared with 
TABLE 4.6 A comparison o f  GDP growth rates for the EC. 
GDP growth rate (per cent per year) 
Economic Response 
Period IIASA/EC High IIASA/EC Low Scenario defined by MACRO 
1975-1985 3.8 2.8 3.0 
1985-2000 3.2 1.9 2.2 
2000-2015 2.4 1.4 1.2 
2015-2030 1.9 1.2 1.1 
TABLE 4.7 Average CDP growth rates (per cent per year) for the period 1975--2000 
for the EC compared with growth rates in the Iilterfutures study. 
- - - - - - - 
Interfu tures IIASA/EC Scenarios Economic Response Scenario 
High (A) 4.4 High 3.4 2.5 
Moderate (B2) 3.3 Low 2.3 
North-South Lift (C) 2.0 
Protectionist (D) 3.0 
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TABLE 4.8 Evolution of  the components of  GDP, 1975-2030, for the EC. 
Percentage of  total GDP 
Components of GDPa 1975 2000 2030 
aZNV, gross fixed capital formation; C, private consumption; G,  government ex- 
penditures for goods and services; X, exports; M imports. 
51%in 1975. In other words, net investment as a percentage of GDP drops from 10.1% to 
4%. This reduction in net investment can be interpreted as a shift in economic activity 
from heavy industries to service-oriented activities. This certainly influences the distribu- 
tion of value added over the economic sectors in MEDEE, as is shown later. The decline in 
investment is offset by increased private and public spending, while exports and imports 
increase to 1.1% and 1.4% greater shares of the total GDP respectively. 
Tables 4.4 and 4.8 set the aggregate economic frame for the sectoral disaggregation 
of economic activities. Since MACRO calculates value added and other parameters of the 
energy sector, the MACRO output serves as direct input to MEDEE. The absolute level of 
value added for the energy sector is affected by the degree of energy import dependence. 
The oil import ceiling in the Economic Response Scenario was taken from the IIASAIEC 
High Scenario. This choice suggested itself since the aggregate demand for secondary 
energy fell halfway between the levels in the IIASAIEC High Scenario and the IIASAIEC 
Low Scenario. The macroeconomic reasons for the high energy intensity of the Economic 
Response Scenario, which seemingly combines the low economic growth of the IIASAIEC 
Low Scenario with an energy allocation (aggregate secondary energy consumption) closer 
to that of the IIASAIEC High Scenario, have been given in section 3.2. As the import ceiling 
for oil is set very low, the domestic energy sector has to raise its production level accord- 
ingly. In the Economic Response Scenario the energy import dependence dropped to 
about 30% by 2030. The considerably higher domestic energy production increased the 
share of value added generated by the energy sector from the present figure of about 4% 
to more than 7%. 
The evolution of the GDP shares of all the other economic sectors represented in 
MEDEE has to be extrapolated on the basis of historical trends and anticipated structural 
changes, some of which depend directly on the level of aggregate economic growth rates 
(e.g. the trend to more service-oriented activities and less heavy industry). Between 1960 
and 1977, although a relatively short period in comparison with the fifty-year study 
period, some notable changes in the GDP formation of the EC were observed. According 
to Table 4.9, the agricultural sector and the construction sector followed a downward 
trend that was mainly compensated by the augmented shares of industry and trade. In the 
light of retarded investment rates and productivity growth rates and the declining labor 
force participation rate, the shifts in the generation of GDP were assumed to be as shown 
in Table 4.10. 
TABLE 4.9 GDP contribution of the EC's main economic sectors (per cent), 1960-1977 (at constant 1975 prices and exchange rates). 
Percentage of GDP by economic sector 
Year 
Relative GDP 
(1975 = 100) 
55 
6 3 
7 0 
88 
9 1 
94 
100 
102 
100 
105 
107 
Relative CDP per capita 
(1975 = 100) Agriculture 
6.5 
5.9 
5.6 
5.1 
5 .o 
4.7 
4.8 
4.8 
4.7 
4.3 
4.4 
Industry 
33.7 
34.1 
34.6 
36.6 
36.5 
36.4 
37.1 
36.9 
35.9 
36.9 
37.6 
Manufacturing 
industrv Construction Trade 
Transportation 
and communication Other 
Source: United Nations (1978). 
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A pronounced shift to the service sector at the expense of the mining and manufac- 
turing sector is the most notable assumption. The shares of agriculture and construction 
continue to decline at historically observed rates. The internal structure of manufacturing 
shows a reduction in the share of basic materials and a higher contribution from machinery 
and equipment. This runs counter to past trends toward decreasing shares for the so-called 
light manufacturing industries (mostly nondurable or semidurable consumer goods) (see 
Table 4.1 1). Within manufacturing these declining shares had been offset by faster growth 
in heavy manufacturing, chemicals, and metal products. The outputs of these subsectors, 
however, are essentially investment goods. In the light of modest GDP growth rates and 
TABLE 4.10 Anticipated shifts in the contribu- 
tions of the EC's econoinic sectors to the G1)P. 
Percentage con- 
tribution to GDP 
Sector 1975 2030 
Agriculture 4.7 3.2 
Construction 7.9 7.0 
Mining and manufacturing 31.8 25.6 
Energy 4.1 7.2 
Services 51.5 57.0 
Manufacturing 
Basic materials 30.0 28.7 
Machinery and equipment 37.0 38.3 
Nondurables 33.0 33.0 
TABLE 4.1 1 The distribution of the EC's industrial production by sectors, 1960-1977. 
Percentage of total industrial production, by year 
Sector 1960 1963 1968 1970 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
Relative total industrial produc- 
tion (1970 = 100) 6 3  7 1  8 8  100 115 116 108 116 118 
Mining/drillinp 
Coal 
Oil 
Metals 
Manufacturing 
Light manufacturing 
Food etc. 
Textiles and apparel 
Wood products 
Paper, printing, and publishing 
Heavy manufacturing 
Chemicals, petroleum, etc. 
Nonmetals, mining products 
Basic metals 
Metal products 
Electricity, gas, water 5.3 6.6 8 A 8.4 

































